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ACHIEVING GENDER EQUITY UNDER TITLE
IX FOR GIRLS FROM MINORITY, URBAN,
RURAL, AND ECONOMICALLY
DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES
KENNETH D. FERGUSON©
I. INTRODUCTION
According to intersectionality theory, discriminatory influences effect
decisions regarding allocations of scarce resources, whether political, financial,
or athletic.1 I experienced an epiphany during a meeting of Faculty Athletic
Representatives (FAR)2 and intercollegiate athletic personnel where Title IX3
issues were discussed. During the discussion, I mentioned that I noticed certain
proposed National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) legislation
contained a section captioned “Title IX impact.” The response assumed that by
balancing spending priorities in men’s football, men’s basketball, and track and
field with appropriate allocations in women’s volleyball, lacrosse, soccer, crew,
and water polo,4 both gender equity and “minority gender equity” would be
 Associate Professor, UMKC School of Law; B.S., Drake University, 1975; J.D., O.W. Coburn
Law School at Oral Roberts University, 1986. This Article was possible because of a Research Grant
by UMKC Law School. I thank my colleagues Daniel Weddle, for allowing me to introduce the ideas
for this Article to his Constitutional Law course, and to William Session, J.D., for listening to my late
night arguments. Thanks also to my Research Assistant, Ben Friesen.
1. See LOUIS KUSHNICK, RACE, CLASS & STRUGGLE: ESSAYS ON RACISM AND INEQUALITY IN
BRITAIN, THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE 46–47 (1998).
2. A FAR is defined by the FAR Association as,
a member of the faculty at an NCAA member institution. He or she has been designated by the institution
to serve as a liaison between the institution and the athletics department, and also as a representative of the
institution in conference and NCAA affairs. . . .
. . . [T]he role of the FAR is “ . . . to ensure that the academic institution establishes and maintains the
appropriate balance between academics and intercollegiate athletics.”

About FARs, FARA, http://farawebsite.org/welcome-to-farawebsite-org/about-fara/about-fars/ (last
visited Mar. 7, 2014) (quoting FARA, CONSTITUTION OF FACULTY ATHLETICS REPRESENTATIVES
ASSOCIATION (2012), available at http://farawebsite.org/welcome-to-farawebsite-org/about-fara/faraconstitution-bylaws/).
3. See generally Patsy Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–
1688 (2012).
4. All of which have been considered emerging women’s sports by the NCAA. See generally
Heather Dinich, The NCAA Road Less Glorified: Athletes in Emerging Sports Play with Passion but
Little Fanfare, ESPN (July 20, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=4336120. In
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achieved. The response effectively disregarded minority women studentathletes. Minority women and other economically disadvantaged studentathletes are a subset of the larger population of women when resource
allocations for women’s sports are compared to total resource allocations for
men’s football, men’s basketball, and track and field. However, after allocation
disparities between men’s sports and women’s sports are identified, institutional
athletic resources are, in addition to women’s basketball, allocated to emerging
women’s sports, volleyball, lacrosse, soccer, crew, and water polo, to create new
participation opportunities to remedy gender inequities. Allocations to
emerging sports will ensure no, or very few, female minority student-athletes or
female student-athletes from other readily identifiable subgroups will
experience the participation benefits promised by Title IX, since few, or
virtually no, minority female student-athletes or female student-athletes from
economically disadvantaged communities or from rural or urban communities
either participate in emerging women’s sports at the interscholastic level5 or at

1991, the NCAA surveyed expenditures for male and female NCAA athletes. NCAA Emerging Sports
Timeline, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Emerging%2BSports%2BHistory.doc
(last visited May 1, 2014). The survey found that while enrollment in NCAA schools was split 50/50
between males and females, “male students constitute[d] about 70 percent of the participants in
intercollegiate athletics” and “receive[d] about 70 percent of athletics scholarship funds, 77 percent of
operating budgets and 83 percent of recruiting funds.” Id. In response to this survey, the NCAA
created the Gender Equity Task Force in 1992. Id. One of the first suggestions of the Task Force was
to create a list of emerging women’s sports. Id. In 1994, the NCAA adopted the Task Force’s first list
that included nine emerging sports. Id. “The NCAA created emerging sports for women as a way to
generate more opportunities for women in collegiate sports in support of Title IX.” Dinich, supra.
Once identified as an emerging sport, “the NCAA allows . . . 10 years for the sport to grow to 40 teams
over all three divisions [(I, II, and III)] before [the sport] is considered a championship sport” and
removed from the list of emerging sports. Id.
The original nine emerging women’s sports included archery, badminton, bowling, ice hockey,
rowing, squash, synchronized swimming, team handball, and water polo. Graham Watson, Emerging
Sports Find Success, Struggles, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=4341135 (last
updated July 21, 2009). Equestrian was added to the list in 1998, rugby in 2002, and sand volleyball
in 2010. Id. Rowing, ice hockey, water polo, and bowling were all removed from the list between 1997
and 2003 because they each gained championship status. Id. Additionally, archery, badminton,
synchronized swimming and team handball were each removed from the list in 2009 for lack of growth.
Id. Currently, this leaves rugby, sand volleyball, squash, and equestrian on the list of emerging sports.
Id.
5. See generally Deborah L. Brake & Verna L. Williams, The Heart of the Game: Putting Race
and Educational Equity at the Center of Title IX, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 199, 201 (2008) (“Most
litigation, public policy, and legal scholarship have focused on athletics at the college level.”) (citing
Jocelyn Samuels, Reviewing the Play: How Faulty Premises Affected the Work of the Commission on
Opportunity in Athletics and Why Title IX Protections Are Still Needed to Ensure Equal Opportunity in
Athletics, 3 MARGINS 233, 255 (2003) (indicating that the absence of data collegiate athletic programs
are required to keep “makes it difficult to monitor high schools’ compliance with Title IX, where serious
enforcement of the law is critical”)).
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the collegiate level of sport.6
In her seminal article on intersectionality Professor Crenshaw quoted the
title of Gloria T. Hull’s book, All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men,
but Some of Us Are Brave7 as a beginning point in developing a Black feminist
critique of antidiscrimination law and feminist legal theory.8 According to
Professor Crenshaw, the book title indicated what she characterized as “a
problematic consequence of the tendency to treat race and gender as mutually
exclusive categories of experience and analysis.”9 Professor Crenshaw’s point
regarding the marginalization of Black women became evident as I pondered a
response to my inquiry regarding why the minority gender equity impact is not
also considered with proposed legislation.
Although the response to my inquiry focused on the fact that minority equity
on the men’s side of sports may have been achieved, minority gender equity or
gender equity for females from broader gender classes—including females from
economically disadvantaged communities—is not achievable by simply
balancing resource allocations for gender equity purposes to sports in which
there is no or very little participation by minority female student-athletes or
female student-athletes from economically disadvantaged, urban, and rural
communities. Increasing resource allocations for female student-athletes in
women’s volleyball, lacrosse, soccer, crew, and water polo—without at the
same time investing in emerging sports in middle schools and high schools in
minority, urban, and rural communities throughout the country—would provide
miniscule benefits to a significant population of potential collegiate women
student-athletes.10 Only ten percent of all African-American female student-

6. See generally Race and Gender Demographics Search, NCAA.ORG, http://web1.ncaa.org/rgd
Search/exec/saSearch (search “2010–2011” for “Select an Academic Year” and search “Division I” for
“Select a Division”; then follow “View Report” hyperlink) [hereinafter Race and Gender
Demographics Search Division I].
7. See generally ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE BLACKS ARE MEN, BUT SOME OF US
ARE BRAVE (Gloria T. Hull et al. eds., 1982).
8. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 139, 139 (1989).
9. Id.
10. Race and Gender Demographics Search Division I, supra note 6. Between 2010–2011, the
number of African-American women in each of these Division I sports, were: water polo (5); crew
(157); lacrosse (53); soccer (451); and volleyball (562). Id. This makes a total of only 1,228—or a
mere 10% of all African-American female Division I athletes, and only 1.6% of all female Division I
athletes in the NCAA. See id. For all NCAA Divisions (I, II, and III), between 2010–2011, the number
of African-American women in each of these Division I sports, were: water polo (9); crew (196);
lacrosse (181); soccer (849); and volleyball (1,443). Race and Gender Demographics Search,
NCAA.ORG, http://web1.ncaa.org/rgd Search/exec/saSearch (search “2010–2011” for “Select an
Academic Year” and search “All Divisions” for “Select a Division”; then follow “View Report”
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athletes who participate in collegiate athletics at the NCAA Division I level
participate in emerging sports.11 Seventy-five percent of all African-American
female collegiate student-athletes are participating in the two sports, which they
have always traditionally had access to: basketball and track and field.12
Overall, the statistics for Asian and Hispanic girls, girls from economically
disadvantaged communities, rural communities, and urban communities
demonstrate that, for them, Title IX’s benefits are only a dream.13
In order to achieve gender equity for minority female students and female
students from urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged communities at the
collegiate level, “gender equity” must be achieved in middle and high school
athletic programs in minority, urban rural, and economically disadvantaged
communities.14 Participation opportunities in NCAA designated emerging
sports must realistically be available to middle school and high schools girls in
urban, rural, minority, and economically disadvantaged communities.
Unfortunately for girls from these communities, participation opportunities are
only available in traditional women’s sports: basketball and track and field.15
Unless middle school and high school girls in urban, rural, and minority
communities are given the opportunities to participate in the emerging women’s
sports, gender equity is being only facially achieved because Title IX
requirements are implemented without specific regard to detrimental impacts on
the aforementioned subgroups.16
This Article will consider the intersection of race, gender, economic status,
and community characteristics with sports participation for girls in grades K–
12 and will argue that there are two categories of intentional discrimination that
are both actionable under Title IX. The first is direct discrimination by a
perpetrator of the discrimination—the person that directly discriminates against
victims.17 The second intentional discrimination category is indifferent
discrimination by a third-party who knows or learns of the direct discrimination,
hyperlink) [hereinafter Race and Gender Demographics Search All Divisions]. This makes a total of
only 2,678—or a mere 12.3% of all African-American female athletes, and only 1.4% of all female
athletes across all three NCAA divisions. See id.
11. Race and Gender Demographics Search Division I, supra note 6.
12. Id.
13. See generally id.
14. See Brake & Williams, supra note 5, at 201 (“For purposes of increasing young women’s access
to athletics, a focus on sports opportunities in college is too late, particularly in the increasingly
competitive environment for women’s intercollegiate sports where there are very few opportunities for
female college athletes to ‘walk on’ to sports.”).
15. See generally Race and Gender Demographics Search Division I, supra note 6.
16. See id. (revealing that African-American female athletes in these sports make up only 10% of
all African-American female athletes, and only 1.6% of all female athletes in Division I of the NCAA).
17. See discussion infra Parts IV(A)(1)–(3).
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has the authority to take corrective action, but fails to take such action.18
The first category of discriminatory conduct is actionable as traditional
intentional discrimination where liability is imposed on the perpetrator because
the perpetrator’s conduct is motivated by a discriminatory purpose.19 The
second category is more nuanced. The discriminatory actor in this case is not
the direct actor. In fact, the violator may have no motive to discriminate at all,
or the discrimination experienced by the victim may be unintentional. The
violator in this case learns of the discriminatory effect and turns a blind eye to
the injury. More accurately, the violator is indifferent to the discriminatory
effect of its policies or programs.20 It is my contention that this second form of
intentional discrimination, “deliberate indifference,” is actionable intentional
discrimination under Title IX.
A school district may be liable for this second form of intentional
discrimination where, for example, its allocation of athletic resources provides
little or no athletic participation opportunities for minority economically
advantaged female students regardless of how well they have met the interests
of other female subgroups.21 Such a school district may not be motivated by
discriminatory animus, but what happens when its administrators learn that their
actions have worked an unintended discriminatory effect on distinctly
identifiable subgroups of female students protected under Title IX? However,
rather than ameliorating the known discriminatory effects of its resource
allocation decision making on protected subgroups under Title IX, school
districts simply ignore the discriminatory effect of their decisions.
To be certain, the school district’s original “remedial” allocation decision
making will not, standing alone, breach the Supreme Court’s traditional
intentional discrimination standard. However, the intentional act that will result
in liability is the deliberate indifference to the effects of that decision-making
on protected subgroups. The doctrine holds that it is the decision not to
ameliorate the unintended consequences of its original decision to allocate
resources that is the wrongful act.22
Part II of the Article will analyze intersectionality theory as the theoretical
framework for examining gender equity, minority gender equity, and gender
inequity occurring under Title IX for females from urban, rural, and
economically disadvantaged communities. Part III of the Article will analyze
sport participation statistics for female students in K–12 and will provide
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See discussion infra Part IV(A)(4).
See infra Part IV(A)(4).
See discussion infra Part IV(A)(5).
See discussion infra Part IV(A)(5).
See discussion infra Part IV(A)(5).
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statistical support for notice to interscholastic educators, athletic administrators,
and school district authorities of gender inequity suffered by female students
from minority, urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged communities.
Although the gender inequities may not have been caused by actionable
intentional discrimination according to the Supreme Court’s traditional
intentional discrimination doctrine under Title IX, actions or inaction by these
institutions may subject them to liability for their deliberate indifference to the
plight of female students affected by institutional policy decisions.
In Part IV, I will articulate the legal basis for establishing a claim for
deliberate indifference intentional discrimination under Title IX. Part IV will
first trace the development of the Supreme Court’s intentional discrimination
doctrine under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Title VI,
and Title IX23 and will argue that the actions or policies of interscholastic
institutions reflect a second form of intentional discrimination because of these
institutions’ deliberate indifference to the impact of their actions or policies on
minority girls and girls from urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged
communities.
Part V will conclude that interscholastic educational institutions may be
held liable for their failure to achieve gender equity under Title IX for girls from
minority, urban, and rural communities, and girls from economically
disadvantaged communities, where educational institutions knew of gender
inequity within these subgroups of females and failed to take adequate measures
to improve participation opportunities for girls from those communities.
II. INTERSECTIONALITY THEORY PROVIDES A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
FOR ACHIEVING GENDER EQUITY FOR GIRLS FROM MINORITY, URBAN, AND
DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES
Intersectionality theory represents a strategy for hastening legal recognition
that identity status has legal consequences and that the forms of discrimination
one is likely to face depend on one’s identity status within a given social
group.24 Intersectionality theory rejects the assumption that all women—of
varying ages, ethnicities, backgrounds, sexual orientation, and political and
geographic locations—have identical experiences.25
According to intersectionality theory, before a court can determine whether
a plaintiff was the victim of actionable discrimination, it should first consider
23. See discussion infra Parts IV(A)(1)–(3).
24. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
701, 702 (2001). (“[D]ifferent status identity holders within any given social group are differently
situated with respect to how much, and the form of, discrimination they are likely to face.”).
25. Id.
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the identity status the plaintiff occupies.26 Paying attention to the plaintiff’s
specific identity status allows the court to distinguish between the typical
conceptualization of racial discrimination as an inter-group phenomenon, where
discrimination is based on a whole racial or gender group,27 and intra-group
discrimination, where the discrimination is based on one’s different identity
status within a particular racial or gender group.28
In her seminal article on intersectionality, Crenshaw’s analysis focused on
three cases29 to illustrate “a common political and theoretical approach to
discrimination which operates to marginalize Black women.”30 Her critique
went beyond the courts, arguing that feminists and civil rights thinkers
committed the same wrong by denying both the unique compoundedness of
Black women’s conditions and Black women’s experiences—as both women
and as Blacks (which often times means Black men)—place them at the
intersection of the classes of women and Blacks.31 The compoundedness of
Black women’s condition allows for Black women, at times, to be absorbed into
the collective experience of women or the collective experience of Blacks.32 At
other times, Black women are considered so different from either group that
their interests are marginalized by both groups.33 According to Professor
Crenshaw, this failure is due less to the “absence of political will to include
Black women,” and more to “an uncritical and disturbing acceptance of
dominant ways of thinking about discrimination.”34
26. Id. (“For example, if the plaintiff bringing a discrimination suit is a heterosexual Asian
American female attorney, courts should adjudicate her discrimination claim with that status identity
in mind. More specifically, the fact that the employer in question treated Asian American men (or
white or other women) well should not be taken as dispositive evidence that the employer did not either
exhibit animus towards or harbor negative impressions of Asian American women.”).
27. Id. at 703 (“Typically, courts conceptualize racial discrimination as an inter-group distinction,
a distinction, for example, between whites and Asian Americans. Under this conceptualization, an
Asian American plaintiff, will typically be required to demonstrate that she was treated differently
(disparately) from a similarly situated non-Asian American (usually a white) employee.”).
28. Id. (“[I]t is possible that [a] firm prefers Asian American men to Asian American women,
discriminating against the latter but not the former. Framing the discrimination question solely in terms
of the plaintiff’s Asian American identity ignores the fact that the plaintiff’s discrimination could be a
function of [a] more specific status identity, her identity as an Asian American female.”).
29. See Crenshaw, supra note 8, at 141–150 (Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475 (9th
Cir. 1983); Payne v. Travenol Labs, Inc., 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982); DeGraffenreid v. General
Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976)).
30. Id. at 150.
31. Id. at 139 n.3, 150.
32. Id. at 150.
33. Id.
34. Id. In support of her argument Professor Crenshaw directs us to:
Consider first the definition of discrimination that seems to be operative in antidiscrimination law:
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A similar critique may be hurled at gender equity analysis reflected in the
law under Title IX and in the practices and policies within interscholastic
institutions. First, by denying the compoundedness of minority studentathletes’ situation and the situation of females from urban, disadvantaged, and
rural communities, these female student-athletes are “absorbed into the
collective experiences of either”35 white female student-athletes or minority
male student-athletes. In that case, minority female student-athletes are counted
with white females students for purposes of determining whether
proportionality exists under a Title IX analysis.36 Yet, their differences from
white female and minority male students place minority female student-athletes
and female student-athletes from urban, disadvantaged, and rural communities
at the margin because their differences are not adequately considered when
devising Title IX solutions. Minority female student-athletes and female
student-athletes from urban, disadvantaged, and rural communities are at the
margin because emerging women’s sports offer no real participation
opportunities for student-athletes with these identity characteristics. The socalled emerging women’s sports and former NCAA designated emerging
women’s sports can pragmatically be described as emerging sports for white
female student-athletes or for female student-athletes from economically
advantaged communities who may, for all practical purposes, reflect the same
population of female student-athletes.37
III. MINORITY GENDER EQUITY AND GENDER EQUITY FOR FEMALE
STUDENT-ATHLETES FROM DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES CANNOT BE
ACHIEVED AT THE COLLEGIATE LEVEL WITHOUT REFORMING POLICY
DECISION MAKING IN INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETICS
Although Title IX has resulted in tremendous gains for women across a
broad opportunity spectrum, ranging from employment, to educational and
media exposure, to athletic participation opportunities, minority women and

Discrimination which is wrongful proceeds from the identification of a specific class or category; either a
discriminator intentionally identifies this category, or a process is adopted which somehow disadvantages
all members of this category. According to the dominant view, a discriminator treats all people within a
race or sex category similarly. Any significant experiential or statistical variation within this group suggests
either that the group is not being discriminated against or that conflicting interests exist which defeat any
attempts to bring a common claim. Consequently, one generally cannot combine these categories. Race
and sex, moreover, become significant only when they operate to explicitly disadvantage the victims;
because the privileging of whiteness or maleness is implicit, it is generally not perceived at all.

Id. at 150–151 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 150.
36. See discussion infra Part IV(A)(5).
37. See discussion infra Part IV(A)(5).
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girls from disadvantaged communities continue to lag behind in realizing the
deliverance Title IX promised. Before enactment of Title IX, minority women
student-athletes participated primarily in basketball and track and field.38 Forty
years after enactment of that monumental piece of legislation, minority
women’s athletic participation opportunities remain limited predominantly to
basketball and track and field.39 Unless a conscious effort is made to ensure
minority female student-athletes and female students from disadvantaged
communities are not left behind in the aftermath of Title IX, athletic
participation opportunities for these subgroups of female student-athletes will
stagnate at current, unacceptable levels.40
Emerging women’s sports and formerly designated NCAA emerging
women’s sports are the sports vehicles through which gender equity is being
achieved at the collegiate level of sports. However, unless participation
opportunities in emerging sports are provided to minority girls and girls from
urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged communities in middle and high
schools, true gender equity in intercollegiate athletics cannot be achieved. Both
intercollegiate and interscholastic institutions have an affirmative obligation
under Title IX to remedy known cases of gender discrimination. Conscious
indifference to unique gender equity issues experienced by minority girls and
girls from urban, economically disadvantaged, and rural communities
constitutes discrimination under Title IX. Further, policy choices made by
interscholastic administrators which reduce, eliminate, or fail to offer, or that
deprive minority females from identified communities of athletic participation
opportunities, constitute intentional discrimination under Title IX.41
Sport participation opportunities statistics for both majority and minority
girls in K–12 and girls from urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged
communities demonstrate that, although gender equity under Title IX has
provided clear sports participation opportunity gains for Caucasian female
student-athletes, minority female student-athletes and other female studentathletes still lag far behind participation opportunities experienced by majority
female students.42 Because female student-athletes from minority, urban, rural,
and economically disadvantaged communities have limited access to emerging
38. Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Black Women, Gender Equity and the Function at the Junction, 6
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 239, 257 (1996) (“Black women were locked into a system that did not offer them
very many opportunities as women and when it did it had very few resources for them. Like Black
men, they encounter stereotyping and stacking within the sports world which steers them into basketball
and track.” (citation omitted)).
39. Id.; Race and Gender Demographics Search Division I, supra note 6.
40. See discussion infra Part IV(A)(5).
41. See discussion infra Part IV(A)(5).
42. See discussion infra Part III(A).
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sports, participation opportunities are limited to traditional women’s sports and
are practically nonexistent for these subgroups through emerging women’s
sports.
A. Race, Ethnicity, Community Location, and Family Financial
Characteristics Adversely Impact Sports Participation Rates of Girls in
Grades 3–12
Children’s athletic ability and interest in physical activity takes shape and
blossoms or dwindles in a social matrix that includes schools, churches,
community organizations, after-school programs, government, and economic
forces.43 The idea that children’s athletic ability and interest in physical activity
takes shape in a social matrix seems reminiscent of the popular saying “it takes
a village to raise a child.”44 Sport molds character, reveals flaws and, for those
who are willing to admit what sports often reveals about one’s character, sports
can contribute to transforming girls into women and boys into men.45 Any
attempt, therefore, to achieve gender equity under Title IX without seeking to
understand what factors influence sports participation opportunities for minority
and majority girls, affirms a status quo where minority girls and other girls
continue to lag behind in having meaningful access to the sports participation
opportunities promised by Title IX.
Addressing the dilemma faced by adolescent and preadolescent female
students from minority, urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged
communities will require transformational changes in policy decision making
engaged in by urban educators, education administrators, and interscholastic
athletic administrators. The sports participation disparity between athletic
participation rates of K–12 minority girls and girls from urban and suburban
communities confirms why, unless there is a change in thinking, “authentic
gender equity” under Title IX cannot be achieved.46 As a whole, more children
43. See generally DON SABO & PHIL VELIZ, WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND., GO OUT AND PLAY:
YOUTH SPORTS IN AMERICA (2008), available at http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/en/home/re
search/articles-and-reports/mental-and-physical-health/go-out-and-play [hereinafter GO OUT AND
PLAY].
44. See, e.g., HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE: AND OTHER LESSONS
CHILDREN TEACH US 12 (1996) (describing the old African proverb “it takes a village” and the
reasoning for incorporating it into the title of her book).
45. The transformation that sports can facilitate in girls and boys may be accelerated or hindered
depending on whether adults, coaches, and leaders of youth are themselves sufficiently mature to accept
what their own successes or failures in sports should have taught them and the character development
that should have resulted from such recognition; for one cannot teach that which one has not been open
to learn or impart insight if one has not been willing to accept what the light has revealed about one’s
successes and failures.
46. See discussion infra Part III.
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are involved in organized sports and participate on sports teams than ever in our
history.47 A national school-based survey of students and parents, conducted
on behalf of the Women’s Sports Foundation, revealed that race, gender,
ethnicity, the community in which girls live and attend school, economic
disparities, and family characteristics impact sports and sports participation
rates for children from the 3rd through 12th grades.48 Results of the study,
summarized in the Women’s Sports Foundation report, Go Out and Play,49
demonstrate that far too many of our minority girls, girls from urban and rural
communities, and girls from economically disadvantaged communities are
missing out on the opportunities that sports can provide.
Go Out and Play was the result of a study that was conducted by Harris
Interactive, Inc., on behalf of the Women’s Sports Foundation and the Center
for Research on Physical Activity, Sport & Health at D’Youville College, which
collaborated in developing the study.50 The study measured the participation
rates of girls and boys in both exercise and organized team sports nationally.51
The study was intersectional in that its central focus was on how the intersection
of race, gender, family income, and urbanicity52 are related to children’s interest
and participation in physical activity and athletics.53
During the study, two nationwide surveys were conducted and both helped
to form the basis upon which the conclusions of the report were drawn. The
first of the two surveys was a school-based survey conducted on youth randomly
selected from a pool of some 100,000 public and private schools in the United
States.54 The national sample size consisted of 2,185 3rd-through-12th-grade

47. GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 8 (demonstrating that of the “estimated 7,342,910
children [who] participated in high schools sports during the 2006–2007 school year,” little is known
about sports participation before high school).
48. Id. at 2–3.
49. Id. at 2–5.
50. Id. at ii.
51. Id. at 2.
52. Urbanicity was used as a variable in the study and defined as,
The urbanicity code (Q410) in the parent survey data file reflects the urbanicity of the plurality of
households in that exchange (the first three digits of a seven-digit phone number, a level of greater detail
than the area code alone). It is not based on a respondents’ [sic] answers. Metropolitan Statistical Areas,
as documented by the Office of Management and Budget, determine urbanicity. Locations in a central city
of a MSA are coded as Urban. Location not in a central city of a MSA are coded as suburban. Locations
not in an MSA are coded as rural. Urbanicity coding is interative process. Census tracts are first coded by
urbanicity based on the plurality of the population in the tract. Then tract-level codes are converted to
exchange-level codes again based on the disposition of the plurality of the population of households.

Id. at 174, 178.
53. Id. at 2.
54. Id.
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girls and boys.55 Phone interviews were also conducted with 863 randomly
selected parents of 3rd-through-12th-grade children.56 Although all parents
were asked their thoughts and feelings about their children’s involvement and
interest in physical activity and sport to deepen researchers understanding of the
needs and experiences girls, boys, and the families of underserved populations,
African-American and Hispanic parents were over-sampled.57
1. Race Effects Participation Rates: Minority Girls Participate in Sports and
Sporting Activities at Significantly Lower Rates than Majority Girls
Participate
The idea that a person’s specific identity status has social, legal, minority
gender equity, and gender equity consequences is evident when one considers
how race and gender intersect to limit sports opportunities for Asian, AfricanAmerican, and Hispanic girls. Figure 1.1 below demonstrates the results of the
study when race, gender, and ethnicity were examined. Caucasian girls
represented 60% of the students who participated in organized sports, whereas
the percentage of minority girls participated in sports was far lower.58 Only
15% of the African-American girls who were surveyed participated in organized
sports, while Hispanic girls represented a slightly higher percentage at 17%.
The participation rate for Asian girls, however, was significantly lower than any
other minority groups. Only 8% of Asian girls surveyed indicated they
participated in organized sports.59 The participation rate for Asian boys almost
doubled that of Asian girls at 13%.60 Asian girls represent a minority group for
which Title IX efforts have not closed the minority gender equity gap.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. It is not clear whether there are cultural issues in play with respect to Asians.
Compare infra Figure 1.1 with infra Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of All U.S. Girls
Who Reported Participating in One or More
Sports
Caucasian

8%

African Americans

17%
60%

15%

Hispanic
Asian
61

Figure 1.2: Distribution of All U.S. Boys
Who Reported Participating in One or More
Sports
Caucasian

13%

African Americans

13%
16%

56%

Hispanic
Asian
62

When female participation rates by race and the level of sports
involvement—measured by whether girls were not involved, moderately
involved,63 or highly involved64—is reviewed, a troubling trend is observed for
Asian girls. The percent of Asian girls that did not participate in sports was
higher than any other racial group at 47%. In addition, the percent of Asian
girls who were moderately or highly involved in sports was lower than any other
racial group. Of the girls surveyed, 44% of Asian girls indicated they were
moderately involved in sports. On the other hand, 54% of Caucasian girls
surveyed indicated they were moderately involved in sports, as compared to
50% of Hispanic girls and 47% of African-American girls.
The survey results for girls highly involved in sports, displayed in Figure
1.3 below, showed a precepitious decline for all racial groups. The participation
rate for Asian girls ranked the lowest of all other racial groups at 9%. The

61. See GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 15.
62. Id.
63. Students moderately involved in sports are defined as those who participated in one or two
sports over the last twelve months. Id. at 11.
64. Students highly involved in sports are defined as those who participated in three or more sports
over the last twelve months. Id.
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participation rate for highly involved Caucasian girls was higher than all racial
groups at 22%, followed by African-American girls at 17%, and Hispanic girls
at 14%.
Figure 1.3: Girls’ Involvement in Sports by Race
60%
50%
40%
30%

54%
50%

47%

47%

Caucasian

44%

36%
36%

African
American
Hispanic

24%

20%

22%
17%
14%
9%

10%

Asian

0%
Not Involved

Moderately Involved

65

Highly Involved

The phenomenon witnessed with respect to the participation rate for Asian
girls was not repeated for Asian boys. Figure 1.4 below demonstrates that Asian
boys had virtually the lowest nonparticipation rate at 22%, nearly identical to
that of African-American boys at 21%. Unlike Asian girls, who represented the
lowest participation rate of all racial groups for girls moderately involved in
sports, Asian boys were tied at 43% with Caucasian boys, while AfricanAmerican and Hispanic boys showed the two highest participation rates at 49%
and 47%, respectively. Asian boys, however, represented the highest percent of
boys who were highly involved in sports at 35%, higher than all other racial
groups. Caucasian boys were highly involved in sports at a rate of 31%,
followed by African-American boys at 30%, and Hispanic boys at 25%.
Literally, the participation rate of Asian girls signals a troubling minority gender
equity and gender equity challenge.66
55%

Figure 1.4: Boys’ Involvement in Sports by Race
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65. Id. at 16.
66. Compare supra Figure 1.3 with supra Figure 1.4.
67. GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 16.

67
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2. The Gender Equity Participation Gap that Persists Between Minority Girls
and Boys Demands a Title IX Remedy
When the gender gap between boys and girls is compared across racial
groups, the participation predicament of Asian girls and other minority girls is
evident. Title IX imposes an affirmative obligation on interscholastic school
districts, educators, and athletic administrators to address the significantly larger
gender gap—which persists between minority girls and boys when compared to
Caucasian girls and boys—where these institutions learn of the disparity.68
Figure 2.1 below examines the gender gap by race for boys and girls not
involved, moderately involved, and highly involved in participating in sports.
When the participation gap between boys and girls is examined for students who
reported they were not involved, moderately involved, or highly involved in
sports, unmistakable trends are observable.

30%

Figure 2.1: Gender Gap in Sports Involvement Between
Boys and Girls by Race
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69

First, there was a significant persistent gender gap, more than any other
racial group, in the nonparticipation rate of Asian girls and boys. The statistics
demonstrated that Asian girls were 25% more likely than Asian boys to not
participate in sporting activity. This percentage is higher than in any other racial
group. African-American girls were 15% more likely than African boys to not
participate in sports and sporting activity. Caucasian girls, however, are doing
better with respect to the gap between nonparticipation rates than for boys and
girls from other racial groups; Caucasian girls were 2% less likely than
Caucasian boys to not participate in sports. Looking at it from the perspective
of Caucasian boys, Caucasian boys were 2% more likely than Caucasian girls

68. See discussion infra Part IV(A)(5).
69. See generally GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 16. The statistics from Figure 1.3, supra,
and Figure 1.4, supra, were used to create this Figure 2.1, which shows the participation gender gap
between Caucasian boys and girls and the participation gender gap between African-American,
Hispanic, and Asian boys and girls.
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to not participate in sports. The lowest nonparticipation rate for minority groups
was that of Hispanic girls. Hispanic girls were only 8% more likely than
Hispanic boys to not participate in sports.
The gender gap statistics for girls moderately involved in sports revealed
that the gender gap between minority girls and boys widens when compared to
the gender gap between Caucasian boys and girls. Caucasian girls were 11%
more likely than Caucasian boys to be moderately involved in sport. The gender
participation gap for Hispanics and Asians decreased, meaning that these girls
were more likely to be moderately involved in sports than that of their male
counterparts. Specifically, Hispanic girls were 7% more likely and Asian girls
were 1% more likely than Hispanic and Asian boys to be moderately involved
in sports. Except for African-American girls, the gender gap between girls and
boys for all racial groups contracted and girls were more likely than boys in
their racial group to be moderately involved in sports. The gender participation
gap for African-American girls was the inverse of the other racial groups.
African-American girls were 2% less likely than African-American boys to be
moderately involved in sports.
Finally, when the statistics for girls and boys who were highly involved in
sports were reviewed, the gender gap for all racial groups increased. Asian girls
were 26% less likely than Asian boys, African-American girls were 13% less
likely than African-American boys, Hispanic girls were 11% less likely than
Hispanic boys, and Caucasian girls were 9% less likely than Caucasian boys to
be highly involved in sports. Clearly, these figures demonstrate that although
the participation gap increased for all racial groups, minority girls—particularly
Asian girls—were more affected. The minority gender equity needs seem to be
far greater for Asian girls. Asian girls were 25% more likely than Asian boys
to not be involved in sports and 26% less likely than Asian boys to be highly
involved in sports.70
3. Family Income has a Significant Impact on Nonparticipating Gender Gap
Between Girls and Boys in Grades 3–12
The compoundedness of minority girls’ experiences—when they
specifically identity as African-American and Hispanic girls and they
experience family income disparities—as the research corroborated, work
together to increase the sports nonparticipation rates for minority girls. As a
result, a single axis approach to addressing gender equity under Title IX
marginalizes African-American and Hispanic girls, who are disproportionately

70. Compare supra Figure 1.3 with supra Figure 1.4.
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poor or live in urban communities.71
i.

The Correlation Between Family Income and Nonparticipation Rate for
Girls in 3rd–8th Grade72 Demonstrates that Family Income Impacts
Gender Equity Under Title IX

We have learned from the study that not only do race and community
characteristics—urban, rural, or suburban—impact sports participation rates
across grades, but so does family income.73 The survey results for girls not
participating in sports during the 3rd-through-8th grades,74 displayed in Figure
3.1 below, revealed that as family income increased, the nonparticipation rate
for girls decreased from 32% for families with yearly income of $35,000 and
lower, to its lowest levels of 15% for families whose median income is between
$50,001 and $65,000. A decrease in nonparticipation is a good sign, because it
signals that, as family income increases, fewer girls in the 3rd through 8th
grades were sitting on the sidelines when it comes to sports participation.
50%

Figure 3.1: Non-Athletic Involvement for Girls by Community
Income
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75

There were, however, slight increases in the nonparticipation rate for 3rd
through 8th grade girls from two groups as family income increased. The first
71. Steven Perlberg, American Median Incomes by Race Since 1967, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 17,
2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-median-income-in-the-us-by-race-2013-9. According to
the article, Asian households recorded the highest median household income, according to the Census
Bureau, in 2012 of $68,636. Id. The median family income was $57,009 for non-Hispanic White
households, $33,321 for African-American (Black) households, $39,005 for Hispanic households. Id.
72. The survey compared nonparticipation and participation rates to family income for two grading
groups: (1) the 3rd through 8th grades; and (2) the 9th through 12th grades. GO OUT AND PLAY, supra
note 43, at 17.
73. Id. at 16 (“The ‘community income level’ was measured by determining the median family
income within the U.S. census track that each of the participating schools in the student survey was
located.”).
74. The survey compared nonparticipation and participation rates to family income for two grading
groups: (1) the 3rd through 8th grades, and (2) the 9th through 12th grades. See infra Figure 3.1.
75. GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 17.
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of these increases occurred in families earning between $35,001 and $50,000.
In that income group, the nonparticipation rate increased to 37%, the highest
nonparticipation rate of all income levels. The reason for this increase warrants
further investigation.76 After the nonparticipation rate had its most sizable drop
from 37% for families earning $35,001 to $50,000 to 15% for families earning
$50,001 to $65,000, nonparticipation increased slightly to 18% for families
earning $65,001 and higher. This increase was not nearly as significant as was
noted with families earning between $35,001 and $50,000 annually.
Unlike the experience of girls, the nonparticipation rate for boys in the 3rdthrough-8th grades, displayed in Figure 3.2 below, showed a steady decline as
family income increased. The nonparticipation rate for boys in the 3rd-through8th grades is 26% for boys from families with a median income of $35,000 or
lower, which is one percentage point lower than its highest level. The
nonparticipation rate increased to its highest level for 3rd-through-8th grade
boys to 27% for families with a median income of $35,001 to $50,000, and then
dropped to 17% at the $50,001 to $65,000 median income range. The
nonparticipation rate dropped again to 14% at the highest median income level.

40%

30%

Figure 3.2: Non-Athletic Involvement for Boys by
Community Income
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Figure 3.3 below demonstrates that as family income increased, girls in 3rdthrough-8th grades with families having median incomes of $50,001 to $65,000
were no longer sitting on the sidelines at a greater rate than boys. The gender
gap between girls and boys who are not participating in sports from families
with income of $35,000 or lower is 6%—indicating that 6% more girls than
boys from families with incomes of $35,000 or lower were not participating in
sports. As family income increased into the $35,001 to $50,000 range, the

76. This is subject matter is left for a subsequent article.
77. Id.
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nonparticipation gender gap also increased to 10%. At these income ranges,
10% more girls than boys were not participating in sports in the 3rd-through8th grades.78 However, for girls from families with median incomes of between
$50,001 and $65,000, the nonparticipation rate began to decrease significantly
relative to that of boys in 3rd-through-8th grades, so that 2% less girls than boys
were sitting on the sidelines.79 Although the nonparticipation rate dropped
again for boys from families with a median of $65,001 and higher, the
nonparticipation rate for girls increased so that 4% more girls than boys are not
participating in sports.80

15%

Figure 3.3: Gender Gap in Sports Non-Athletic
Involvement Between Boys and Girls by Community
Income
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81

Clearly, since African-American and Hispanics are minorities groups who
are overrepresented in the two lower median income groups—$35,000 and
lower and between $35,001 and $50,00082—the high nonparticipation rate of
3rd-through-8th-grade girls in these income groups raises minority gender
equity as well as “economic gender equity” concerns under Title IX. The
nonparticipation rates for 3rd-through-8th-grade girls from families in these two

78. The nonparticipation rate for boys increased slightly from 26% to 27% for boys from families
with incomes in the $35,001 to $50,000 range. However, the nonparticipation rate of girls increased
from 32% to 37%, demonstrating a 10% increase in the nonparticipation rate of girls.
79. According to Figure 3.3, infra, 3rd–8th grade girls are 2% less likely than boys to not
participate in sporting activities. Figure 3.1, supra, and Figure 3.2, infra, indicate that the
nonparticipating rate for boys dropped to 17%, while the girls’ nonparticipation rate dropped to 15%,
for families earning a median income between $50,001 and $65,000.
80. The data points in Figures 3.2, infra, demonstrate that the nonparticipation of boys dropped to
14% for family median income of $65,001 and higher. However, Figure 3.1, supra, showed that the
nonparticipation of girls increased to 18% for girls from families with median income of $65,001 and
higher. This nonparticipation rate indicates 4% more 3rd-through-8th-grade girls than boys are not
participating in sports, even at this income range.
81. See GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 17.
82. Id.; see also Perlberg, supra note 71.
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income ranges also correspond to the high nonparticipation rate for girls that
live in urban communities, as well as African-American and Hispanic girls.
Family income and community characteristics may not adequately explain the
nonparticipation rate of Asian girls, however. The study revealed that race,
income disparity, and community characteristics work together to increase the
sports nonparticipation rates for minority girls.83 As a result, a single axis
approach to addressing gender equity under Title IX marginalizes minority girls,
who are disproportionately poor and live in urban communities, and also fails
to remedy a growing minority gender equity problem in sports. The single axis
approach also marginalized girls from urban, rural, and disadvantaged
communities.84
ii. During the 9th–12th Grades, as Family Income Increases, the
Nonparticipation Rate for Girls Decreases
Survey results were not only very different for girls and boys in the 9ththrough-12th grades, the results raise broader gender equity and minority gender
equity concerns. The percentage of both girls and boys who are not participating
in sports activity during the 9th-through-12th grades are considerably higher
than during earlier grades, however.85 The nonparticipation rate for 9ththrough-12th-grade girls and boys were high across all income groups. For
example, the nonparticipation rate for girls from families with family income of
$35,000 and lower income is 43%.86 While the nonparticipation rate for boys
is lower than that of girls, 31%, that figure is significantly higher than for 3rdthrough-8th-grade boys.87 At this median family income level, 12% more girls
than boys surveyed indicate they did not participate in sports.
The nonparticipation rate for girls and boys dropped and remained relatively
close to each other between families with median family incomes of $35,001 to
$50,000.88 The nonparticipation gender gap drops to 4%: only 4% more girls
are not participating in sports during high school than boys. Although the
nonparticipation rate of girls from families with a median income of $50,001 to
83. Id. Since Asian household median incomes are the highest among minority groups, one would
not expect the high nonparticipation gender gap of Asian girls and this is demonstrated in Figure 2.1,
supra. Id.
84. Id.
85. Compare the nonparticipation rate statistics for girls in Figure 3.1, supra with Figure 3.2, supra.
86. The nonparticipation rate for 3rd-through-8th-grade girls from the same family income bracket
is 32%.
87. The nonparticipation rate for 3rd-through-8th-grade boys from the same family income bracket
is 26%.
88. The nonparticipation rate for girls at this median family income bracket was 31%, while the
nonparticipation rate for boys was 27%. See supra Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2.
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$65,000 is unchanged, the nonparticipation rate for boys increased to 31%,
resulting in a nonparticipation gap of zero. The nonparticipation rate for both
girls and boys from families with a median income of $65,001 and higher
increased,89 so that only 3% more girls than boys are not participating in sports
activities. Why such a drastic change in the nonparticipation rate during 9ththrough-12th grades as compared to the nonparticipation rate witnessed in 3rdthrough-8th grades is unclear.90
4. Participation Rates for Highly Involved 3rd-through-8th-Grade Girls and
Boys and Family Income
Figure 4.1 confirms that as family income increases, there is a
corresponding increase in the participation rate of 3rd-through-8th-grade girls
who were highly involved in sports. The participation rate of 3rd-through-8thgrade girls increased from 17% for girls from families with family income of
$35,000 or lower to 19% for girls from families with family income of $35,001
to $50,000. On the other hand, the participation rate for boys highly involved
in sports increased from 27% to 33%. The participation rate increased again for
both genders to 27%, for girls from families with family income in the $50,001
to $65,000 range, and to 45% for boys highly involved in sports activities. At
the highest family income bracket, $65,001 and over, the participation rate for
3rd-through-8th-grade girls increased to 34%; however, the participation rate
for boys in the same grades and family income level dropped slightly to 44%.
Figure 4.1: High Athletic Involvement for Girls by
Community Income
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The gender gap between girls and boys at each family income level was
even more pronounced. As Figure 4.3 demonstrates, there was a 10% gender
participation gender gap between girls and boys from families with median

89. Compare supra Figure 3.1 (where the nonparticipation of girls is increase to 36%) with supra
Figure 3.2 (where the nonparticipation rate for boys increase to 33%).
90. That question is left for a subsequent article.
91. See GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 18.
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family income of $35,000 or lower: meaning that 10% more boys than girls
were highly involved in sports in the 3rd through 8th grades at lower median
family incomes. As family income increased to between $35,001 and $50,000,
the gender participation gap also increased. According to the survey, as the
median family income increased to between $35,001 and $50,000, 14% more
boys than girls were highly involved in sports. As median family increased to
between $50,001 and $65,000, the participation gender gap increased to 18%,
indicating that 18% more boys than girls were highly involved in sports in that
median family income range. Although the participation rate for boys in the
3rd-through-8th grades dropped by 1% for boys from families earning $65,001
or higher, the participation gender gap was still at 10%; meaning that 10% more
boys than girls were highly involved in sports in the 3rd-through-8th grades.
According to the survey results, there are grave gender equity concerns for high
school girls that have not been adequately addressed under Title IX.
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Figure 4.2: High Athletic Involvement for Boys by Community
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Figure 4.3: Gender Gap for High Athletic Involvement Girls
and Boys by Community Income
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92. Id.
93. See id.
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5. Participation Rates for Highly Involved 9th-through-12th-Grade Girls and
Boys and Family Income
The graph of the participation rates for 9th-through-12th-grade girls who
were highly involved in sports by family income in Figure 4.1 was umbrella
shaped. Whereas, the graph of the nonparticipation rates for girls in the 9ththrough-12th grades in Figure 3.1 was shaped like an upside down umbrella,
demonstrating an inverse relationship between the nonparticipation rates for
girls in the 9th-through-12th grades and the participation rates of highly
involved 9th-through-12th-grade girls from families with the same family
income characteristics. As family median income increased for 9th-gradethrough-12th-grade girls, the participation rate of girls highly involved in sports
steadily increased, slightly more than doubling from 7% for girls from families
with income of $35,000 or lower to 16% for girls from families with income
between $35,001 and $50,000. The participation rate remained the same at 16%
for girls from families with income between $50,001 and $65,000. The
participation rate of highly involved girls in the 9th-through-12th grades
dropped back almost to that of the lowest income level at 11% hence the
umbrella shaped graphic.
The upside down shaped umbrella graphic depicting the nonparticipation
rate by family income tracked in Figure 3.1, demonstrates that the
nonparticipation rate for 9th-through-12th-grade girls was highest at 43%, for
girls from families with income of $35,000 or lower. The nonparticipation rate
dropped to 31% for girls from families with family income between $35,001
and $50,000 and remained the same for girls from families with family income
between $50,001 and $65,000. Although the nonparticipation rate at the highest
family income level ($65,001 and higher) increased to 36%, it did not reach its
highest rate. Instead the highest rate was seen for girls from families with the
lowest family income at 43%.
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 both confirm that significant changes in
participation rates occur for both girls and boys during 9th through 12th grades.
While the participation rate for girls highly involved in sports from families
whose median income was $35,000 or lower was only 7%, the participation rate
increased and remained at 16% for girls from families with median incomes
between $35,001 to $50,000 and $50,001 to $65,000. The participation rate
dipped to 11% for girls from families earning $65,001 or more. The
participation rates for boys, however, were highest at both the lowest median
income range, $35,000 and lower, and highest when the median income was in
the range of $65,001 and higher. At both these income ranges, the participation
rate for boys highly involved in sports was 24%, representing significant
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participation gender gap between boys and girls at both family income ranges.
As Figure 4.3 demonstrates, while at the lowest income range 17% more boys
than girls were highly involved in sports, at the highest median income range
13% more boys than girls were highly involved in sports in the 9th through 12th
grades. The participation gender gap remained the same at 5% for both the
$35,001 to $50,000 and $50,001 to $65,000 median income categories—only
5% more boys than girls were highly involved in sports at this grade backet.
Even at the highest income brackets, more work still remains to be done to
satisfy the directives of Title IX. Where interscholastic institutions,
administrators, educators, and athletic programs are aware that the gender gap
continues to presist for girls belonging to specific identity groups—including
racial minority groups, and girls from urban, rural and economically
disadvantaged communities—and fail to take steps to alleviate the
discrimination faced by these identity groups, the insitutions has acted
deliberately indifferent to the discrimination faced by these identitiy groups.
Deliberate indifference constitutes intentional discrimination under Title IX,
and Title IX may be relied on to remedy this form of gender discrimination.94
6. Variations in Minority Gender Gap in Athletic Participation Driven by
Race and Community Income
The study revealed that family financial resources was one of several factors
that effected both gender equity and also minority gender equity. Family
financial resources,95 race,96 and community characteristics,97 all of which
separately effect gender equity, operate as additives98 that profoundly influence
gender equity. This section considers the relationship between race (children of
color),99 family income, and gender for children highly involved in sports. As
shown in Figure 6.1 below, after studying race and family income, it became
clear that the participation rate for Caucasian girls highly involved in sports
progressively increased as family income increased. Caucasian girls from
families with median family income of $35,000 or lower that were highly
involved in sports participated at a rate of 9%. The participation rate for these
girls doubled to 18% for families earning between $35,001 and $50,000. There

94. See infra Part IV(A)(4).
95. See discussion supra Parts III(A)(3)–(5).
96. See discussion Part III(A)(6).
97. See discussion infra Parts III(A)(7)–(9).
98. See discussion Part III.
99. It is not clear why the study examined the participation rate of “children of color” and not the
participation rate for the specific racial identity groups that were considered in the study: Caucasians,
Hispanics, African-Americans, and Asians.
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was a slight increase in the participation rate to 23% for Caucasian girls from
families with median family incomes of between $50,001 and $65,000.
However, the largest increase in participation rates occurred for Caucasian girls
from families earning $65,001 or higher—the participation rate improved to
38%.
Figure 6.1: Highly Involved for Girls by Community
Income
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The experience of girls of color was significantly different from that of
Caucasian girls. The participation rate of girls of color highly involved in sports,
from families earning $35,000 or lower, was significantly higher than that of
Caucasian girls at 15%. Girls of color, with a median family income between
$35,001 and $50,000 who were highly involved in sports, participate in sport at
a rate of 16%, two percentage points lower than Caucasian girls. The
participation rate of girls of color dropped to 7% for girls of color from families
with a median family income of between $50,001 and $65,000, while the
participation rate of Caucasian girls increased from 18% to 23%. Although the
participation rate of girls of color from families in the highest family income
range, $65,001 and higher, surged back up to 13%, the participation rate of
Caucasian girls also increased significantly to 38%—25%higher than girls of
color.
The participation rate for Caucasian boys when compared to boys of color
portrayed a different picture than that for Caucasian girls, in Figure 6.2 below.
The participation rate of Caucasian boys was only significantly greater than
boys of color for families with a median income of between $50,001 and
$65,000. In that income range, the participation rate for Caucasian boys highly
involved in sports was 36%, double that of boys of color, which was 18%. At
the lowest family income range, $35,000 or lower, the participation rate for boys
of color was 5% higher than Caucasian boys. At the $35,001 to $50,000 family
income range, the participation rate for boys of color was 11% higher than
Caucasian boys. Finally, at the highest family income range, $65,001 or higher,
100. See GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 19.
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the participation rate increased to 40% for Caucasian boys, but that rate is only
6% higher than boys of color.
Figure 6.2: Highly Involved for Boys by Community
Income
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The participation gender gap, displayed in Figure 6.3 below, persisted at all
median income categories, although at the highest median household income
level, where Caucasian girls participated in sports 2% less than Caucasian boys,
the participation gap narrowed. Girls of color from families with family income
of $65,001 or more were 21% less likely to participate in sports at a high level
than boys of color. As one considers the other family income levels, the story
is much different. Caucasian boys were 10% more likely than Caucasian girls
to be highly involved in sports where family income was $35,000 or below. As
the median family income increased to between $35,001 and $50,000, the
gender gap decreased to 9%, so that Caucasian girls were 9% less likely than
Caucasian boys to be highly involved in sports. When family income was
between $50,001 and $65,000, 13% more Caucasian boys than girls were highly
involved in sports. However, as mentioned above, the gender gap narrowed
again at median family income of $65,001 or more. At the highest median
income range, Caucasian girls were 2% less likely than Caucasian boys to be
highly involved in sports. It appears that for Caucasian girls, Title IX is working
for at least girls who—although still 2% lower than Caucasian boys—come
from families with median family incomes of $65,001 and greater, because the
participation gap for Caucasian girls was at its lowest level by 2% less than the
participation rate of Caucasian boys.

101. See id.
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Figure 6.3: Gender Gap for Highly Involved Girls and
Boys by Community Income
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The gender participation gap for girls and boys of color from families
earning $35,000 or less did not show significant variance from the gender
participation gap between Caucasian boys and girls. At that family income
level, there was a participation gender gap of 10% for children of color: 10%
more boys of color are highly involved in sports at this median family income
group than girls. Girls of color whose families’ median family income was
between $35,001 and $50,000 and were highly involved in sports, participate in
sport at a rate of 16%—2% lower than Caucasian girls. However, as Figure 6.3
illustrates, although the gender participation gap between Caucasian girls and
boys was only 9%, the gender participation gap between boys and girls of color
more than doubled that of Caucasian girls and boys: 22% more boys of color
than girls of color were highly involved in sports, where their median family
income was between $35,001 and $50,000.
The gender participation gap of boys and girls of color was only 11% for
children from families with a median family income between $50,001 and
$65,000. That is, at the $50,001 to $65,000 median family income range, 11%
more boys of color were highly involved in sports than girls of color. The
participation gender gap between Caucasian boys and girls was slightly higher
at 13%; 13% more Caucasian boys were highly involved in sports than
Caucasian girls.
There was a significant disparity between the participation rate of girls of
color and Caucasian girls whose median family income was $65,001 or higher.
Figure 6.1 shows that although the participation rate for girls of color almost
doubled to 13% at family income of $65,001 or higher, the participation rate for
Caucasian girls grew to 38% at this income level. Although gender parity was
achieved (or at least close to) for Caucasian girls in the highest income range,
this was not the case for girls of color. There is almost no gender gap for
Caucasian girls at the highest income bracket. Caucasian girls highly involved

102. See id.
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in sports participated at a rate that was only 2% lower than Caucasian boys.
Girls of color, on the other hand, participated at a rate that was 21% lower than
boys of color.
The fact that, as family income increased, the sports participation rate of
girls of color decreased, was unexpected. It is not clear why the gender gap
virtually disappeared for Caucasian girls as family income reached its highest
level in the survey and not for girls of color.103
7. The Community Where 3rd–through-12th-Grade Girls Live Influences
Their Nonparticipating Rate in Sporting Activities
Studying the rate at which girls and boys are not participating in sports—
the nonparticipation rate—gives us a glimpse of their interests in sports and
physical activities. If the nonparticipation rate is noted to be greater for one
group—minority and urban girls as compared to suburban girls or rural girls—
the higher nonparticipation rate means that more members of that group are not
participating in sporting activities and should prompt us to consider factors
contributing to the rate differential. If there is any hope of achieving minority
gender equity under Title IX, strategic efforts must be made to reduce the
number of minority girls, girls from urban communities, and girls from
economically disadvantaged communities who were not participating in sports,
by developing strategies for increasing participating opportunities in emerging
and formerly designated NCAA emerging women’s sports.
It is reasonable to conclude from the Go Out and Play study that urban
communities consist predominantly of minority groups.104 The percentages of
girls from urban communities that were not participating in sports were at their
highest points at two grade levels: the first was in the 3rd grade through 5th
grade, and again in the 9th-through-12th grades. The study revealed, as
displayed in Figure 7.1 below, that 41% of urban girls in both the 3rd-through5th grades and the 9th-through-12th grades were not involved in sports
activities. The nonparticipation rate of urban girls at these two grade levels was
higher than both girls and boys from suburban105 and rural106 communities.
103. The answer to this question is worth further investigation.
104. See generally GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43.
105. Only 19% of suburban girls in the 3rd-through-5th grades and 31% in the 9th-through-12the
were not involved in sports; whereas, the percent of suburban boys not involved in sports was 11% in
the 3rd-through-5th grades and 29% for the 9th-through-12th grades. Compare infra Figure 7.1 with
infra Figure 7.2.
106. Only 26% of girls from rural communities do not participate in sports at the 3rd-through-8th
grades, while that figure increases to 35% in the 9th-through-12th grades; however, although the figure
for boys from rural communities who do not participate in sports in the 3rd-through-5th grades is higher
than boys from both urban and suburban communities at 31%, and that figure increases by only 3% for
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Girls from suburban communities show their lowest percent of non-involvement
in sports during the 3rd through 5th grades at 19%. The percentages of girls
from suburban and rural communities that were not involved in sports in the
9th-through-12th grades, although lower than urban girls, were relatively close
to each other: 31% for suburban girls and 35% for rural girls. Rural girls did
not fare much better than urban girls. Other than minority girls, rural girls
represented girls with the next highest rate of nonparticipation during the 3rdthrough-5th grades at 26%.
Figure 7.1: Girls’ Non-Involvement in Sports by
Community
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In these formative ages, where sport participation is critical, urban girls in
the 3rd-through-5th grades had a nonparticipation rate that was much higher rate
than girls and boys from urban, suburban, and rural communities. The earlier
an athlete begins participating in sport, the more proficient that athlete becomes
in sports as they mature.108 The increase in the nonparticipation rate for urban
girls noted in the 3rd-through-5th grades was repeated again in the 9th-through12th grades—the grades during which potential collegiate female studentathletes were recruited to participate in traditional, emerging, and formerly
designated NCAA emerging women’s sports at the collegiate level.109
Interestingly enough, however, unlike suburban girls and girls from rural
communities, where the nonparticipation rate gradually increased from the 3rdthrough-12th grades, the nonparticipating rate of urban girls dropped to 22%—

rural boys in the 9th-through-12th grades to 34%. Id.
107. See generally GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 13.
108. Heart of the Game, supra note 5, at 201. The authors’ stated the following:
For purposes of increasing young women’s access to athletics, a focus on sports opportunities in college
is too late, particularly in the increasingly competitive environment for women’s intercollegiate sports
where there are very few opportunities for female college athletes to “walk on” to sports. It takes years
and years of competitive play to have the necessary skill to take advantage of the sports opportunities
Title IX has created at the college level.
Id. (citations omitted).
109. See generally id.

FERGUSON ARTICLE - FORMATTED FINAL

382

6/4/2014 4:07 PM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:2

its lowest level—just before urban girls enter high school—6th-through-8th
grades. The nonparticipation rate of urban girls in the 6th-through-8th grades
fell below the nonparticipation rates of both suburban and rural girls. The
nonparticipation rates of suburban and rural girls in the 6th-through-8th grades
was 30% and 31%, respectively.110 The nonparticipation rate for urban girls in
the 6th-through-8th grades was also lower than the nonparticipation rate for
urban boys at 24% and rural boys at 29%.
Figure 7.2: Boys’ Non-Involvement in Sports by
Community
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The data demonstrates that girls from urban and minority communities are
interested in playing sports. As the nonparticipation rate for minority and urban
girls at the middle school level decreased, there was a corresponding increase,
over girls from other communities, in the sports participation rate of urban girls
moderately involved in athletics. Figure 7.3 below shows that while 54% of
urban girls surveyed were moderately involved in sports—6% higher than
suburban and rural girls that were moderately involved in sporting activities—
both suburban and rural girls participate at a 48% rate. As demonstrated below
in Figure 9.1, when the participation rate of urban girls that were highly
involved in sports during middle school—6th-through-8th grade—is compared
to girls from both suburban and rural communities, a similar trend is seen. The
participation rate of urban middle school girls that were highly involved in
sports was 24%, while the participation rate for suburban and rural girls was at
22% and 21%, respectively. Figure 9.1 below also demonstrates that during
high school the participation rates of urban, suburban, and rural girls highly
involved in sports clustered between 12% and 15%: rural girls at 15%, suburban
girls at 14%, and urban girls at 12%.

110. Of the suburban girls surveyed, 30% are not involved in sports, while 31% of rural girls are
not involved in sports.
111. See GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 14.
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Figure 7.3: Girls’ Moderate Involvement in Sports by
Community
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The problem, however, for urban girls and minority girls is that participation
opportunities in emerging sports are virtually unavailable in their
communities.113 Therefore, while Title IX is achieving gender equity by
increasing participation opportunities in emerging and formerly designated
NCAA emerging sports, minority girls and girls from urban, rural, and
economically disadvantaged communities are not receiving the benefits
promised by Title IX because those participation opportunities are not
reasonably available in those communities.114
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Figure 7.4: Boys’ Moderate Involvement in Sports by
Community
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112. See GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 13.
113. See A. Jerome Dees, Do the Right Thing: A Search for an Equitable Application of Title IX
in Historically Black Colleges and University Athletics, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 219, 266 (2004) (“These
emerging sports have been dubbed country club sports by a number of critics. Minority leaders blame
college administrators for what they call a poor selection of sports in their attempt to try to comply with
Title IX. The former NCAA chairman of the Minority Opportunity Committee stated that the selected
sports are ‘traditionally very white, middle class sports . . . exclusive to people of color.’ The athletic
opportunities created by these sports have resulted in few additional opportunities for black women,
the core constituents of HBCUs. The ol’ girls network now in place has white women at the controls
of women’s athletics and black women on the outside of the process; for white women power and
opportunity is concentrated in their hands while black women are clustered into track and basketball.”
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted)); Brian L. Porto, Completing the Revolution: Title IX as Catalyst
for an Alternate Model of College Sports, 8 SETON HALL. J. SPORT L. 351, 382 (1998) (“AfricanAmerican women do not benefit as much as white women do from the establishment of women’s
college teams in ‘emerging’ sports because those sports, such as soccer, lacrosse, and softball, are
popular in white suburban and rural communities, but are not popular in urban communities, where
many African-American women live.” (footnote omitted)).
114. Id.
115. See GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 14.
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8. Participation Rate of Girls in Grades 3–12 Moderately Involved in Sports
Is Influenced by Community Location, Economic Disparities, Race,
Ethnicity, and Family Characteristics
Much of the focus for closing the gender gap in collegiate sports has been
at the collegiate level, and rightly so. However, closing the gender gap for
minority girls, girls from urban and rural communities will require cultivating
fertile ground much earlier in the lives of girls, and boys, for that matter, than
at the collegiate level. Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 above examined statistics for
girls and boys moderately involved in sports. Unlike urban girls, Figure 7.3
confirmed a steady increase in the percent of suburban girls moderately engaged
in sports beginning in the 3rd-through-5th grades and continuing through high
school (9th-through-12th grades). In the 3rd-through-5th grades, 46% of
suburban girls surveyed were moderately involved in sports. That number
increased to 55% by the 9th-through-12th grades.116 The highest percent of
girls surveyed who indicated moderate participation in sports was for rural girls
in the 3rd-through-5th grades at 54%.117 The percent of rural girls moderately
participating in sports dropped to 48% in the 6th-through-8th grades, before
increasing again to 51% in their high school years.
The trends in participation rates for urban girls who were moderate sports
participants indicate that these girls may offer a potential population for
narrowing the minority gender equity gap between urban girls and the gender
gap between girls from both suburban and rural communities. The percentage
of urban girls surveyed who were moderately engaged in sports was 47% in the
3rd-through-5th grades, and was slightly higher than the participation rate for
suburban girls who were at 46%. The participation rate for urban girls
moderately involved in sports peaked in middle school at 54% and dropped
slightly to 48% in the high school grades. The participation rate of urban girls
moderately involved in sports during the 9th-through-12th grades was lower
than both girls living in rural and suburban communities.
The participation rate for urban boys in the 3rd-through-5th grade who were
moderately involved in sports was 48%—higher than the participation rate of
rural boys in the same grades at 42% and that of suburban boys at 39%. The
participation rate for urban boys in the 6th-through-8th grades moderately
involved in sports dropped to 39%, which was below the participation rates for
rural boys at 43% and suburban boys at 42%. As Figure 7.4 demonstrates, much
116. A similar phenomenon was seen with suburban boys moderately involved in sports, where
there is a steady increase in participation from 39% in grades three through five to 49% for 9th through
12th grade boys. See supra Figure 7.4.
117. The participation rate for rural boys in the same grade range was in between the participation
rate for urban boys at 48% and that of suburban boys at 39%.
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like urban girls, the participation rate for urban boys in the 9th-through-12th
grades who were moderately involved in sports at 43% was lower than any other
group.118 The participation rate for suburban boys in the 9th-through-12th
grades at 49% was the highest of all communities studied, including boys from
rural communities at 46%.
The gender gap statistics depicted in Figure 8.1 demonstrate that, except for
urban boys and girls in the 3rd-through-5th grades, at all other grade levels, girls
that were moderately involved in sports were participating, regardless of the
community in which they live, at a greater rate than boys—there was no gender
gap at these grade levels. The gender gap for girls from rural communities
declined from its highest levels at 12% in the 3rd-through-5th grade; girls from
rural communities particitated at a moderate level at 12% more than boys from
the same community. In the 6th-through-8th grades, rural girls were only 5%
more likely than boys to be moderately involved in sports. The gender gap for
girls from suburban communities who were moderately involved in sports
dropped to zero in the 9th-through-12th grades.
Figure 8.1: Gender Gap Moderate Involvement and
Community
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The gender gap between 3rd-through-5th-grade boys and girls from urban
communites who reported that they were moderately involved in sports was
only 1%—only 1% more boys than girls from urban communities moderately
participated in sports. The participation rate for girls from urban communities
decreased to -15%, meaning that 15% more urban girls than urban boys were
moderately involved in sports in the 6th-through-8th grades. A similar trend in
the gender gap was demonstrated for girls and boys from suburban and rural
communities in the 6th-through-8th grades; 5% more rural girls and 6% more
suburban girls were moderately involved in sports than boys from those
respective communities. The sports participation rate of girls from urban,
surburban, and rural communities that were moderately involved in sports, both
prior to and in the 9th-through-12th grades, suggests fertile ground for achieving
118. Compare supra Figure 7.3 with supra Figure 7.4.
119. See GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 13–14.
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gender equity across a broader identity spectrum, and should forecast better
participation opportunities and gender equity gains for all girls highly involved
in sports during the 9th-through-12th grades.
9. What Happens to Sports Participation Opportunity Gains for Girls Highly
Involved in Sports by 12th Grade
Figure 9.1 demonstrates that urban girls in the 3rd-through-5th grades
surveyed who indicated they were highly involved in sports had the lowest
participation rate of girls from all communities at 11%. However, much as was
the case with urban girls who were moderately engaged in sports; in the 6ththrough-8th grades, the participation rate for urban girls doubled to 24% and
was higher than girls from all other communities. In the 3rd-through-5th grades,
girls from suburban communities who were highly involved in sports had the
highest participation rate of girls from all communities at 36%. There was,
however, a precipitous drop in the participation rate of suburban girls highly
involved in sports, from 36% in the 3rd-through-5th grades to 22% for girls
from suburban communities in 6th-through-8th grade. The participation rate of
rural girls surveyed who were highly involved in sports had a participation rate
of 20% in the 3rd-through-5th grades; however, the participation rate only
increased by 1% to 21% in the 6th-through-8th grades. By the 9th-through-12th
grades, however, rural girls who were highly involved in sports participated at
a higher level of participation at 15% than both suburban girls at 14%, and urban
girls at 12%.
Figure 9.1: Girls High Involvement in Sports by
Community
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A gender gap existed when the participation rates of boys highly involved
in sports were compared to girls at all grades levels, as displayed in Figure 9.3
below. The participation rate for suburban boys in the 3rd-through-5th grades
at 51% was 15% higher than suburban girls in the same grades. The difference
between the participation rates of urban boys at 33% and urban girls highly

120. See id. at 13.
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involved in sports displayed a greater gender gap of 22%—22% more urban
boys than urban girls in 3rd-through-5th grades were participating in sports at
the highest level. However, there was only a 7% difference between the
participation rates of rural boys at 27% and rural girls at 20% in the 3rd-through5th grades. Seven percent more rural boys than rural girls were participating in
sports at the highest level in the 3rd-through-5th grades.

55%

Figure 9.2: Boys High Involvement in Sports by
Community
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Figure 9.3: Gender Gap High Involved and Community
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The gender gap between girls and boys highly involved in sports was still
apparent in the 6th-through-8th grades for girls from all communities. It is
apparent that at these grades, suburban and urban girls were losing the
participation game to suburban and urban boys. The participation rate for
suburban boys was 17% higher than the participation rate of suburban girls in
6th-through-8th grades. However, the gender gap for urban boys and girls was
at 14%. The participation rate of highly involved rural boys was 7% higher than
the participation rate of rural girls.
It is clear that in high school, urban girls are falling behind all groups as far
as the participation gender gap is concerned. The gender gap narrowed between
suburban boys and girls in the 9th-through-12th grades. The participation rate
for suburban boys was 8% higher than the participation rate for suburban girls.
121. See id. at 14.
122. See id. at 13–14.
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The gender gap narrowed even more when the participation rates of rural boys
were compared to those of rural girls. The participation rate for rural boys was
only 5% higher than rural girls. The gender gap was at its highest rate, however,
between urban boys and girls, with urban boys participating at a rate 13%
greater than urban girls. Clearly, more work needs to done to bridge the gender
gap between girls and boys from all communities, particularly the gender gap
between girls and boys from urban communities.
IV. HARVESTING TITLE IX TO ENHANCE PARTICIPATION OPPORTUNITIES FOR
GIRLS FROM MINORITY, ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED, URBAN, AND
SUBURBAN COMMUNITIES
Caucasian female student-athletes are flourishing because of participation
opportunities available through emerging sports, while African-American,
Hispanic, Asian, and other minority female student-athletes are consistently
denied the access to participation opportunity benefits Title IX was enacted to
confer. Girls from minority, urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged
communities have such limited access to emerging sports that their participation
opportunities are virtually limited to traditional women’s sports and are
essentially nonexistent with respect to emerging women’s sports.123
Educational institutions that receive federal funds, which recognize these
inequities and turn a blind eye to them, may be liable under Title IX.124
Title IX affirmatively obligates federal funds recipients to eliminate not
only traditional intentional discrimination, but also known instances of
“deliberate indifference” to inequities occurring within those institutions. The
Supreme Court has developed an expanded intentional discrimination
doctrine,125 as seen in the Supreme Court’s “deliberate indifference”
jurisprudence that will provide a Title IX remedy for victims who lack access
to sports participation opportunities in emerging women’s sports known to be
created by institutional policy choices that perpetuate gender inequities
experienced by minority girls, girls from urban, economically disadvantaged,
and rural communities.126 Regardless, however, of their status as members of
a racial minority group or members of other identity groups, “deliberate
123. See Race and Gender Demographics Search Division I, supra note 6. See also Lauren Smith,
Black Female Participation Languishes Outside Basketball and Track, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June
29, 2007), http://chronicle.com/article/Black-Female-Participation/21449; Timothy Davis, Race and
Sports in America: An Historical Overview, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 291, 309 (2008).
124. See infra Part IV(A)(4).
125. See generally Derek W. Black, The Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of Action: The Court’s
Expanded Concept of Intentional Gender and Race Discrimination in Federally Funded Programs, 67
MD. L. REV. 358, 379 (2008).
126. See discussion infra Parts IV(A)(1)–(4).
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indifference” of high school and middle school athletic decision makers, school
districts, and state education administrators to whether their policy choices
sustain gender inequities or undermine Congressional objectives Title IX was
enacted to promote, constitutes actionable intentional discrimination.127
A. Traditional Intentional Discrimination Analysis Under Title IX Does Not
Reach Conduct that Constitutes Disparate Impact Discrimination
Unlike Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, Title VI and Title IX impose
an affirmative obligation on programs receiving federal funds to remedy
discrimination once officials become aware of the consequences of their
programs or policies.128 In this section of the Article, I will examine the
differences and similarities between application of intentional discrimination
and “deliberate indifference” standards for assessing liability under Title IX and
will argue, private cause of action aside, the obligation to provide equal access
to sports participation opportunities exists for educational institutions that
receive federal funds. Therefore, programs whose administration or policies
deny equal access to sports participation opportunities are vulnerable to losing
federal funding if they do not act to correct the problem. They should also be
vulnerable to private action once responsible program officials are aware of the
effects of their programs or policy decisions and remain “deliberately
indifferent” to the programs’ effects.129
To begin my analysis, I will analyze the Supreme Court’s intentional
discrimination and disparate impact jurisprudence under the Equal Protection
Clause, Title VI, and Title IX and will apply the Court’s “deliberate
indifference” analysis, developed under the Supreme Court’s sexual harassment
cases, to gender equity claims and claims of denial of access to sports
participation opportunities under Title IX. Application of the Court’s
“deliberate indifference” doctrine to gender equity claims and claims of denial
of access to sports programs under Title IX will enable advocates of gender
equity to achieve gender equity under Title IX for minority girls, girls from
urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged communities.
1. Intentional Discrimination and Race Under the Equal Protection Clause
The standard applied in determining whether actions taken constitute
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution

127. See discussion infra Parts IV(A)(1)–(4).
128. See Black, supra note 125, at 402–03; see also discussion infra Part IV(A)(1)–(3).
129. See infra notes Parts IV(A)(1)–(4).
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was articulated by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis.130 The case
involved two African-American (then called Negros) police officers who filed
suit against the Commissioners of the United States Civil Service Commission,
the Commissioner of the District of Columbia, and the Chief of the District’s
Metropolitan Police Department asserting that promotion policies of the police
department were racially discriminatory because of the policies’ disparate
impact on African-American applicants.131 In reaching its decision that, absent
purposeful discrimination, disparate impact is not sufficient to establish
intentional discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the Supreme Court chronicled its historical approach to intentional
discrimination.132
Starting with the Supreme Court’s 1880 decision in Strauder v. West
Virginia, the Washington Court reasoned that, although Strauder “established
that the exclusion of all Negroes from grand and petit juries in criminal” cases
would constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the fact that a
particular jury is not statistically representative of the community—without
more—is not sufficient to establish “invidious discrimination.”133 The
purposeful intent to exclude members of a particular race from jurymen,
although the sine quo non of establishing intentional discrimination, may be
proven by showing a systemic exclusion of eligible members of the particular
race from jury pools or by unequal application of the law to members of that
race.134
The Washington Court continued its examination of the historical standard
employed in determining intentional discrimination. The Court examined how
the standard had been applied in the context of legislative redistricting, where
the Court had previously upheld a New York apportionment statue against a
claim that redistricting lines were “racially gerrymandered.”135 The statute was
upheld even though, as a result of the redistricting, the districts that were

130. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Although the case involved the Equal Protection under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, the Supreme Court indicated that the standard applied in Equal
Protection cases under the Fourteenth Amendment is not different than would be applied under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 239.
131. Id. at 232.
132. Id. at 239.
133. Id. (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)).
134. The Washington Court stated, “A purpose to discriminate must be present which may be
proven by systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of the proscribed race or by unequal application of
the law to such an extent as to show intentional discrimination.” Id. at 239 (quoting Akins v. Texas,
325 U.S. 398, 403–404 (1945).
135. Id. at 240 (citing Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 58 (1964)).
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challenged were rendered either predominantly white or minority districts.136
The Court upheld the statute because the challenger failed to demonstrate that
the legislature, when the statute was enacted, was motivated by race or that the
legislature intentionally drew the districts along racial lines.137
The Washington Court next considered the school desegregation cases, in
which the Supreme Court adhered to the equal protection principle that
discrimination must be traced to a “racially discriminatory purpose.”138 The
Equal Protection Clause is not violated, the Court commented, simply because
there are predominantly black and white schools in a community.139 According
to the Court, there must be intentional state action to segregate or a state purpose
to segregate.140
In support of its claim that intentional discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause meant more than disparate impact discrimination, the
Washington Court recounted why its recent decision rejected a desperate impact
discrimination claim, where the basis for the claim was an alleged racially
discriminatory effect of certain provisions of the Social Security Act.141
Holding that discrimination occurred simply because certain provisions of the
Social Security Act have a statistically discriminatory effect on a racial group
would, according to the Washington Court, render any differential treatment a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the absence of racial
motivation and regardless of the legitimate rationale for such treatment.142
This does not mean, however, that disparate impact discrimination can
never be the basis for finding intentional discrimination or that disparate impact
is irrelevant in determining intentional discrimination.143 The Court in
136. Id.
137. Id. (“[T]he plaintiffs had not shown that the statute ‘was the product of a state contrivance to
segregate on the basis of race or place of origin.’” (quoting Wright, 376 U.S. at 58)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. (“The essential element of de jure segregation is ‘a current condition of segregation
resulting from intentional state action.’ . . . ‘The differentiating factor between de jure segregation and
so-called de facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate.’” (quoting Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.
1, 413 U.S. 189, 205, 208 (1973)).
141. Id. at 240–41 (citing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972)).
142. Id. (reiterating that “[t]he Court has also recently rejected allegations of racial discrimination
based solely on the statistically disproportionate racial impact of various provisions of the Social
Security Act because ‘[t]he acceptance of appellants’ constitutional theory would render suspect each
difference in treatment among the grant classes, however lacking in racial motivation and however
otherwise rational the treatment might be.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 548
(1972)).
143. Id. at 242 (“Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an
invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the
rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the
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Washington signaled that Yick Wo v. Hopkins144 was an important illustration
of this point. The defendants in Yick Wo were incarcerated for violating a San
Francisco City ordinance which made it unlawful to conduct a laundry business
within the city and county without consent of the board of supervisors.145
Laundries that were constructed of brick or stone were exempt from the
statute.146 The defendants alleged that of the 320 laundries within the city and
county of San Francisco, 240 were owned by persons of Chinese decent, and
310 of the total were constructed of wood.147 Over 200 applicants of Chinese
decent that had conducted their business for over twenty years who applied to
the board of supervisors for a license were denied.148 Only one applicant that
was not of Chinese decent was denied a license by the board of supervisors.149
The Washington Court determined that the ruling in Yick Wo was one example
of a context in which the disparate impact of a statute on persons of Chinese
decent was evidence that the board of supervisors committed intentional
discrimination in its application of a neutral statute.150
The Supreme Court’s rulings addressing racial discrimination in a series of
jury selection cases provided a second example of disparate impact
discrimination, based on racial statistical disparities, was proof of intentional
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.151 The Washington
Court observed that the systematic exclusion of African-Americans from juries
demonstrated intentional discrimination resulting from asymmetrical
application of the law.152 A plaintiff could make out a prima facie case for
intentional discrimination by showing, in addition to the absence of AfricanAmericans on a particular jury, proof that the jury commissioners were never
informed of the number of African-Americans in a community that were eligible
to serve on the jury or that the jury selection process that was not racially
neutral.153
The Supreme Court applied its ruling in Washington, a Fifth Amendment
weightiest of considerations.” (citation omitted)).
144. Id. at 241 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
145. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 357.
146. Id. at 358.
147. Id. at 358–59.
148. Id. at 359.
149. Id.
150. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (“A statute, otherwise neutral on its face,
must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race.” (citing Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at
373–74)).
151. Id. at 241.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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case, to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.154 In affirming its
decision in Washington, the Arlington Heights Court observed that the
unconstitutionality of an official zoning board will not be judged solely on
whether its action resulted in disproportionate impact on a racial group.155
Although not irrelevant, the Court noted, racially disproportionate impact “is
not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination.”156 The Court
found that the parties failed to carry the burden, proving that the Village of
Arlington Heights was motivated by a discriminatory purpose in its decision to
deny rezoning and, therefore, ended the Court’s constitutional inquiry.157
2. Intentional Discrimination and Gender Under the Equal Protection Clause
In Personnel v. Feeney, the Supreme Court examined whether the
intentional discrimination standard applicable to race cases under the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States would be similarly applied to sex
discrimination claims.158 The plaintiff—Helen Feeney—was not a veteran.159
During her twelve-year tenure as a state employee for the state of
Massachusetts, Helen Feeney had scored well on competitive civil service
examinations.160 However, because of Massachusetts’s veterans’ preference
statute, male veterans who scored lower than her were always ranked higher
than her for civil service positions.161 As a result, the preference granted males
an immense advantage over females.162 The plaintiff challenged the veterans’
154. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
155. Id. at 264–65.
156. Id. at 264–65 (The Court made it clear that the intentional discrimination standard it
established in Washington applied to the Fourteenth Amendment, by stating, “Our decision last Term
in Washington v. Davis made it clear that official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because
it results in a racially disproportionate impact. ‘Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not
the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination.’ Proof of racially discriminatory intent or
purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” (quoting Washington, 426 U.S.
at 242 (citation omitted))).
157. Id. at 270–71 (“Respondents simply failed to carry their burden of proving that discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor in the Village’s decision. This conclusion ends the constitutional
inquiry. The court of Appeals’ further finding that the Village’s decision carried a discriminatory
‘ultimate effect’ is without independent constitutional significance.” (footnote omitted)).
158. 442 U.S. 256, 267 (1979) (“The present case is apparently the first to challenge the
Massachusetts veterans' preference on the simple ground that it discriminates on the basis of sex.”).
159. Id. at 256.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 257–58. The preference applied to the state of Massachusetts’s classified civil
service position, which represented 60% of the state’s public jobs. Id. at 261–62. “Although the
veterans’ preference thus does not guarantee that a veteran will be appointed, it is obvious that the
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preference statute on the ground that the preference, which required state
governmental employers to consider veterans who served during a war ahead of
nonveterans, violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.163
In reaching its decision that the Massachusetts statute passed Equal
Protection scrutiny, the Court acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment
did not strip states of all power of classification.164 All laws classify, the Court
acknowledged, so long as rationally based, the fact that legislative
classifications unevenly impact certain groups, normally raises no constitutional
concerns.165 In evaluating the constitutionality of such a state classification, the
concern is the validity of the classification and not the legislature’s wisdom in
enacting the law, so long as there is no reason to infer hostility on the part of the
legislature.166
Before addressing the standard it would apply in determining whether the
Massachusetts statute discriminated on the basis of gender, the Court reviewed
the constitutional standard applied in determining race discrimination claims
under the Equal Protection Clause.167 Racial classifications, the Court
preference gives to veterans who achieve passing scores a well-nigh absolute advantage.” Id. at 264.
Further, historically Massachusetts sought to insure that women veterans were covered by the statutory
preference for veterans:
Notwithstanding the apparent attempts by Massachusetts to include as many military women as
possible within the scope of the preference, the statute today benefits an overwhelmingly male class. This
is attributable in some measure to the variety of federal statutes, regulations, and policies that have restricted
the number of women who could enlist in the United States Armed Forces, and largely to the simple fact
that women have never been subjected to a military draft.

Id. at 269–70 (footnote omitted).
163. See id. at 259. Plaintiff’s case was consolidated with a case filed by Carol A. Anthony, an
attorney, whose efforts to secure a position as a Civil Service Counsel I were similarly frustrated. Id.
at 259 n.3. Over the objections of the defendants—state officials—the Attorney General of
Massachusetts appealed to the Supreme Court who certified for decision of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts whether the Attorney General may appeal the matter over the objections of state
officials-defendants. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled in favor of the Attorney
General. Id. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of its decision in Washington v. Davis: that without purposeful discrimination,
the Equal Protection Clause of Fifth Amendment is not violated simply because the statute had a
disparate impact on racial groups. Id. at 281. On remand the District Court ruled the statute violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth amendment, because the disparate effect of the statute
was too inevitable to be unintended. Id. at 260–61.
164. Id. at 271.
165. Id. at 272 (“The calculus of effects, the manner in which a particular law reverberates in a
society, is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility.”).
166. Id. (“When some other independent right is not at stake, and when there is no ‘reason to infer
antipathy,’ it is presumed that ‘even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the
democratic process . . . .’” (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (citations omitted)).
167. See id. at 271–72.
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recapped, are presumptively invalid and would be upheld only upon an
“extraordinary justification.”168 The same is true for a neutral statute that is an
apparent pretext for racial discrimination.169 The Court made clear, however,
that even a neutral statute that has a disproportionate impact on minority groups
will not be struck down unless the impact is traceable to a racially
discriminatory purpose.170 Classifications based on gender, according to the
Court, are afforded similar treatment under Equal Protection analysis.171
The question the Court considered in applying its Equal Protection
precedent was whether the system of classification instituted by the
Massachusetts statute was based, plainly or surreptitiously, on gender.172 The
Court accepted plaintiff’s concession in the case that the statute was neutral on
its face.173 The Court also agreed with the District Court’s determination that
the statute served a legitimate purpose and that the preference was not
established for the purpose of discriminating against women.174 The Court
signaled, as it did in its race cases to which its Equal Protection analysis applied,
that gender impact alone could establish discriminatory purpose, if there was
not a plausible neutral ground for the classification system established by the
statute.175
However, comprehension of the inevitable impact of the veterans’
preference statute on women is not intentional discrimination for constitutional

168. Id. at 272.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 273 (“[P]recedents dictate that any state law overtly or covertly designed to prefer males
over females in public employment would require an exceedingly persuasive justification to withstand
a constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
172. Id. at 274.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 274–75 (“The [plaintiff] has thus acknowledged and the District Court has thus found
that the distinction between veterans and nonveterans drawn by [the statute] is not a pretext for gender
discrimination. The [plaintiff]’s concession and the District Court’s finding are clearly correct.”).
175. Id. at 275. The Court stated,
Apart from the facts that the definition of “veterans” in the statute has always been neutral as to gender and
that Massachusetts has consistently defined veteran status in a way that has been inclusive of women who
have served in the military, this is not a law that can plausibly be explained only as a gender-based
classification.
....
Just as there are cases in which impact alone can unmask an invidious classification, there are others, in
which—notwithstanding impact—the legitimate noninvidious purposes of a law cannot be missed. This is
one. The distinction made by [the statute] is, as it seems to be, quite simply between veterans and
nonveterans, not between men and women.

Id. (citation omitted).
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purposes.176 The statute violates the Equal Protection Clause if it was enacted
to serve a discriminatory purpose, but does not violate the Constitution because
of its disproportionate impact on women.177 The statute’s disparate impact may
raise an inference that discrimination may be in play, but an inference that
discrimination may exist is not proof of intentional discrimination.178
3. Intentional Discrimination Under Title IX and Title VI
Without a private right of action under Title IX and Title VI, enforcement
of and impositions of penalties for discrimination in violation of the respective
statutes would be limited to withholding of or denial of federal funds.179
i.

Private Right of Action Title IX

Courts180 and commentators181 have recognized that Title VI and Title IX
are coextensive. Analysis of Title VI and Title IX, therefore, will proceed
simultaneously. The Supreme Court in Cannon v. University of Chicago, in
determining whether a private right of action existed to recover damages or seek
injunctive relief under Title IX, analyzed why decisions under Title VI were
relied on to determine the question of whether a private right of action existed
under Title IX. 182 The plaintiff, Geraldine Cannon, alleged in her complaint
that, although she was qualified to attend both the University of Chicago and
Northwestern Medical schools—based on her grade point average and her

176. Id. at 279. The Court reasoned,
“Discriminatory purpose,” however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part “because of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group. Yet nothing in the record demonstrates that this preference for veterans was originally
devised or subsequently re-enacted because it would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a
stereotypic and predefined place in the Massachusetts Civil Service.

Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 279 n.25 (“But in this inquiry—made as it is under the Constitution—an inference is a
working tool, not a synonym for proof. When, as here, the impact is essentially an unavoidable
consequence of a legislative policy that has in itself always been deemed to be legitimate, and when, as
here, the statutory history and all of the available evidence affirmatively demonstrate the opposite, the
inference simply fails to ripen into proof.”).
179. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 638–39 (1999). See generally Gebser
v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
180. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2005); see also Grove City
Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566 (1984); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 514 (1982);
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694–99 (1979).
181. Black, supra note 125, at 365.
182. See generally Cannon, 441 U.S. at 677.
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medical school examination scores—she was denied admission because of her
gender.183 Both medical schools admitted candidates that were less qualified
than her.184 Ms. Cannon claimed that because both institutions had policies
against admitting applicants over the age of thirty—unless they had advanced
degrees—these institutions discriminated against women. 185 Since women
have higher incidences of interrupted higher education, the policies had a
disproportionate and discriminatory impact on women.186
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Seventh Circuit’s
decision that Ms. Cannon had no private right of action against the
defendants.187 The Court determined that—for the sake of argument, the
defendants admitted certain facts in their motion to dismiss—only two facts
were relevant to its resolution of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling.188 First, Ms.
Cannon was excluded from admission to the respective medical schools because
of her sex.189 Second, each institution received federal funds.190 The admitted
facts, according to the Supreme Court, established “a violation of § 901 (a) of
Title IX of the Education Amendments to the 1972.”191 The real question was
whether Ms. Cannon could have brought an action to recover damages for the
violations.
In concluding that the Seventh Circuit’s decision was wrong, the Supreme
183. Id. at 680–81 n.2.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 681 n.2 (Cannon contended that “[t]hese policies . . . prevented [her] from being asked
to an interview at the medical schools, so that she was denied even the opportunity to convince the
schools that her personal qualifications warranted her admission in place of persons whose objective
qualifications were better than hers.”).
186. Id. (Cannon claimed that both “the age and advanced-degree criteria operate to exclude
women from consideration even though the criteria are not valid predictors of success in medical
schools or in medical practice. As such, the existence of the criteria either makes out or evidences a
violation of the medical school’s duty under Title IX to avoid discrimination on the basis of sex.”
(citation omitted)).
187. Id. at 685–86. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he Court of Appeals agreed that the
statute did not contain an implied private remedy. Noting that § 902 of Title IX establishes a procedure
for the termination of federal financial support for institutions violating § 901, the Court of Appeals
concluded that Congress intended that remedy to be the exclusive means of enforcement.” Id. at 683–
84.
188. Id. at 680.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. Shortly after the Seventh Circuit’s decision, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act of 1976. Id. at 685. The amendment authorized attorneys’ fee awards to the winning
party in a Title IX enforcement action. Id. The Court of Appeals granted a petition to rehear the case
in light of the passage of the Civil Right Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976. Id. at 685–86. On
rehearing, the court ruled that the Act did not intend to create a new right of action, where one did not
exist. Id.
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Court carefully reviewed the four factors laid down in Cort v. Ash that, if
satisfied, would indicate Congressional intent to create an implied private right
of action.192 The first factor, whether the plaintiff was a member of the class
Congress intended to benefit by enactment of Title IX, was answered in the
affirmative by the Supreme Court.193 The second, the legislative history of Title
IX, required the Cannon Court to look beyond the legislative history of Title IX
and also consider the relationship of Title IX to Title VI and to other
Congressional actions.194
The Court concluded that where a federal right is created, it may not be
necessary to demonstrate an intention to create a private right of action.195
Under those circumstances, however, an explicit purpose to deny a private right
of action would be controlling.196 Title IX’s history clearly demonstrated,
however, that Congress did intend to create a private right of action.
The Court chronicled the relationship between Title VI and Title IX to
demonstrate that decisions under Title VI were relevant to its determination of
whether Congress intended an implied private right of action under Title IX.197
The Court first indicated that Title IX was patterned after Title VI. 198 The
legislative history of Title IX demonstrates that, except for substitution of the
word “sex” for the words “race, color, or natural origin” in Title VI, the
benefited class in both statutes was described using the identical language.199

192. Id. at 688 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)). Those factors include
[(1)] [I]s the plaintiff ‘one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,’ that is, does the
statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? [(2)] [I]s there any indication of legislative intent,
explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? [(3)] [I]s it consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? [(4)] [I]s the cause of action
one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?

Id. at 688–89 n.9 (citations omitted) (quoting Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
193. Id. at 693–94 (“Unquestionably, therefore, the first of the four factors identified in Cort favors
the implication of a private cause of action. Title IX explicitly confers a benefit on persons
discriminated against on the basis of sex, and petitioner is clearly a member of that class for whose
special benefit the statute was enacted.”).
194. Id. at 694 (“We must recognize, however, that the legislative history of a statute that does not
expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the
question.”).
195. Id.
196. Id. (“[I]n situations such as the present one ‘in which it is clear that federal law has granted a
class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of action,
although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would be controlling.’” (quoting Cort, 422
U.S. at 82).
197. Id. at 695–709.
198. Id. at 694 (“Title IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”).
199. Id. at 694–95.
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The origin of Title IX also demonstrates its link with Title VI. Although Title
IX began as a house bill that would have added the word “sex” to the list of
discriminatory conduct prohibited by Title VI, the house bill, which ultimately
became Title IX, was taken out of Title VI—because Title IX’s focus was
slightly more limited than that of Title VI. 200 The administrative method for
terminating federal funding for an institution engaged in discrimination
prohibited under both Title IX and Title VI mirrored each other, and neither
statute expressly provided for a private right of action for the benefited class.201
When Title IX was enacted in 1972, according to the Cannon Court, Title
VI had already been interpreted by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to provide
private right of action, an opinion that had been repeatedly cited with
approval.202 Noting that a dozen federal courts had reached the same conclusion
that Title VI provided for a private right of action, the Court ruled that it was
justified in presuming that Congress intended a private right of action under
Title IX.203 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that both private
citizens and Congressional representatives are presumed to know the state of
the law.204 Further, repeated references by Congressional representatives to
Title VI validated their intent that Title IX would be interpreted to provide for a
private right of action.205 Finally, the Court determined that it was not necessary
to rely on the presumption, because the language and history of the collection
of statutes that Title IX was a part of, demonstrated that Congress understood
that the private right of action that existed with respect to Title VI would also
be found in its companion statute, Title IX.206
Having concluded that the second factor established by the Cort decision
was satisfied, that there was historical support for a private right of action under
Title IX, the Cannon Court turned its attention to the third factor established by
Cort: a prohibition against implying a private right of action, which “would

200. Id. at 695 n.16 (“Although [the house bill] never made it through the House, its sex
discrimination provision was lifted from it, modified along the lines suggested in the 1970 hearings,
and included in the House Resolution that was amended and adopted by the House as its version of
what became [Title IX].”).
201. Id. at 696 (“The drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that it would be interpreted and applied
as Title VI had been during the preceding eight years.”).
202. Id. at 696.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 696–97.
205. Id. at 696–98 (“It is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other
citizens, know the law; in this case, because of their repeated references to Title VI and its modes of
enforcement, we are especially justified in presuming both that those representatives were aware of the
prior interpretation of Title VI and that that interpretation reflects their intent with respect to Title IX.”).
206. Id. at 699.
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frustrate the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme.” 207 Title IX, like the
statute it was modeled after, Title VI, was aimed at achieving two objectives:
(1) preventing the use of federal funds to support discriminatory practices; and
(2) affording protection to individual citizens against those discriminatory
practices.208 The mechanism for achieving the first goal is found in the power
to terminate the federal funding of institutions that discriminate on the bases of
race (Title VI) or sex (Title IX).209 However, terminating federal funding,
although austere, may not efficiently serve the needs of individuals who have
been discriminated against.210 Affording protection to individual citizens
against institutional discriminatory practices may be more effectively achieved
by providing a private right of action to the party discriminated against.211
The final factor under Cort is satisfied because implying a federal remedy
in the form of a private right of action would be appropriate, since the subject
matter is not one of state concern.212 Since the Civil War, the federal
government and federal courts have been a powerful source of protection
against discrimination, and it is the distribution of federal funds that provides
justification for the statutory prohibition in the first place.213 Although Cannon
resolved whether a private right of action existed under Title IX, the decision
did not address the standard to be applied in determining whether discrimination
has been proven.
ii. Private Right of Action Title VI
As discussed above, when Title IX was enacted in 1972, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon, had
already interpreted Title VI to provide private right of action.214 The Bossier
Parish School Board opinion had been repeatedly cited with approval. Prior to

207. Id. at 703.
208. Id. at 704.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 705 (“[I]t makes little sense to impose on an individual, whose only interest is in
obtaining a benefit for herself, or on HEW, the burden of demonstrating that an institution’s practices
are so pervasively discriminatory that a complete cutoff of federal funding is appropriate.”).
211. Id. at 705–06 (“The award of individual relief to a private litigant who has prosecuted her
own suit is not only sensible but is also fully consistent with—and in some cases even necessary to—
the orderly enforcement of the statute.”).
212. Id. at 708.
213. Id. at 708–09 (“Moreover, it is the expenditure of federal funds that provides the justification
for this particular statutory prohibition. There can be no question but that this aspect of the Cort analysis
supports the implication of a private federal remedy.”).
214. See generally Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
388 U.S. 911 (1967); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696 n.20.
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the enactment of Title IX, lower courts had already determined that a private
right of action existed under Title VI.215 The Supreme Court in Alexander v.
Sandoval confirmed that a private right of action existed under Title VI.216
The question before the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Sandoval was
whether a private individual has a right to enforce agency regulations
prohibiting disparate impact discrimination under Title VI. 217 By accepting
financial assistance from the United States Department of Justice and the
Department of Transportation, the Alabama Department of Transportation
subjected itself to Title VI’s restrictions, which prohibited the Alabama
Department of Transportation from excluding anyone from its programs or
activities on account of their race, color, or national origin.218 Before reaching
its decision that no private right of action exists to enforce agency regulations
prohibiting disparate impact discrimination under Section 602 of Title VI,219
the Sandoval Court acknowledged that it was beyond dispute that a private
individual may bring an action to recover damages and to seek injunctive relief
under Section 601 of Title VI.220
The Sandoval Court noted that the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Cannon v. University of Chicago (fully discussed above) was instructive.221 In
Cannon, the Court acknowledged that Title VI and Title IX were equivalent
enactments and that Congress had intended Title IX, like Title VI, to provide a
private cause of action.222 The Sandoval Court concluded that Cannon
“embraced the existence of a private right to enforce Title VI as well.”223 What
was more significant, the Sandoval Court observed, was Congressional
ratification of the holding in Cannon when Congress enacted Section 1003 of
215. See id.
216. 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).
217. Id. at 278.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 288 (“Section 602 authorizes federal agencies ‘to effectuate the provisions of [§ 601]
. . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000d–1 (2012)).
220. Id. at 280–81 (“For purposes of the present case, however, it is clear from our decisions, from
Congress's amendments of Title VI, and from the parties’ concessions that three aspects of Title VI
must be taken as given. First, private individuals may sue to enforce § 601 of Title VI and obtain both
injunctive relief and damages.” (footnote omitted)).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 280 (“The reasoning of [the Cannon] decision embraced the existence of a private right
to enforce Title VI as well. ‘Title IX,’ the Court noted, ‘was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.’ And, ‘[i]n 1972 when Title IX was enacted, the [parallel] language in Title VI had already
been construed as creating a private remedy.’ That meant, the Court reasoned, that Congress had
intended Title IX, like Title VI, to provide a private cause of action.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694, 696 (1979)).
223. Id.
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the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986.224 That provision specifically
eliminated the states’ sovereign immunity defense against action brought to
enforce Title VI in federal court and provided for equitable and legal remedies
for a private individual in such actions.225 Therefore, the Court reaffirmed that
a private individual has a right to sue to enforce rights provided under Title
VI.226
The second aspect of Title VI that Sandoval recognized must be accepted
as a given is that Section 601 of Title VI prohibits only intentional
discrimination.227 Finally, the Sandoval Court recognized that regulations
promulgated under Section 602 of Title VI228 may validly ban disparate impact
discrimination, although the banned activities may be perfectly acceptable
under Section 601.229 The activities banned under regulations authorized by
Section 602—because the action has a disparate impact on protected racial
224. Id. (“Congress has since ratified Cannon’s holding. Section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–7, expressly abrogated States’ sovereign
immunity against suits brought in federal court to enforce Title VI and provided that in a suit against a
State ‘remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available . . . to the same extent as
such remedies are available . . . in the suit against any public or private entity other than a State.’”
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–7(a)(2)).
225. Id. (“We recognized in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, that [the amendment]
‘cannot be read except as a validation of Cannon’s holding.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Franklin v.
Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 72 (1992))).
226. Id. (“It is thus beyond dispute that private individuals may sue to enforce § 601.”).
227. Id. The Court traced it intentional discrimination jurisprudence beginning with Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, where the Supreme Court was asked to review “a decision of the California
Supreme Court that had enjoined the University of California Medical School from ‘according any
consideration to race in its admissions process.’” Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 272 (1978)). The Sandoval Court noted that “[e]ssential to the Court’s holding reversing that
aspect of the California court’s decision was the determination that § 601 ‘proscribe[s] only those racial
classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.’” Id. at 280–
81 (alteration in original) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287). The Sandoval Court then considered the
Supreme Court’s decision in Guardians Assn. v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York,
where “the Court made clear that under Bakke only intentional discrimination was forbidden by § 601.”
Id. at 281 (citing Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 610–11 (1983)
(Powell, J., concurring)). Finally, the Sandoval Court, stated that Alexander v. Choate “is true today:
‘Title VI itself directly reach[es] only instances of intentional discrimination.’” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985)).
228. Section 602 of Title VI provides that:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to
any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is
authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section [601] of this title with respect to such program
or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which
the action is taken.

42 U.S.C. § 2000d–1 (2012).
229. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281.
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groups—are only enforceable by the federal funding agencies, and not by
private individuals.230 The Sandoval Court, however, did not address whether
the failure of a federal funds recipient to remedy disparate impact discrimination
known to such federal funds recipient constitutes “deliberate indifference” that
would qualify as intentional discrimination in violation of Section 601 of Title
VI. Sandoval also did not address what conduct amounted to intentional
discrimination or even how a plaintiff may prove intentional discrimination.231
Guidance to answering these questions may be garnered from the Supreme
Courts sexual harassment Title IX cases.
4. “Deliberate Indifference” Standard for Sexual Harassment Claims Under
Title IX
To turn a blind eye to conduct or policies of an institution that receives
federal funds and is known to deny participation opportunities Title IX was
enacted to ensure constitutes intentional discrimination and entitles victims to a
private cause of action against such institutions.232 This approach to evaluating
intentional discrimination, a standard that is more flexible than the Supreme
Court’s traditional intentional discrimination analysis under both Title VI and
Title IX, emerges upon a closer examination of the Supreme Court’s sexual
harassment cases, beginning with the Gebser line of cases.233 Title IX not only
imposes an obligation to prevent discrimination motivated by intent to
disadvantage or to benefit a particular racial or gender group, it also prohibits
discrimination that results from conduct or policies that demonstrate disregard
for the effect of institutional policies or individual conduct on groups protected
by Title IX, where the disregarder knows of the effects of its conduct or policies,
has the authority to remedy the discriminatory effects, and chooses not to, or
fails to make any reasonable effort to remedy.234

230. See id. at 292–93.
231. Black, supra note 125, at 372.
232. Id. at 380.
233. Id. at 380–81.
234. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). The Court indicated that
the response of a federal funds recipient determines whether it will be liable for damages under Title
IX (“We think, moreover, that the response must amount to deliberate indifference to discrimination.
The administrative enforcement scheme presupposes that an official who is advised of a Title IX
violation refuses to take action to bring the recipient into compliance. The premise, in other words, is
an official decision by the recipient not to remedy the violation.”). Id.
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Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District

Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District involved a sexual
harassment claim filed against the Lago Vista Independent School District and
the sexual harasser.235 The sexual harassment initially began as inappropriate
and aggressive sexual comments made by Frank Waldrop, a high school teacher,
to students in his classes.236 It escalated to Waldrop inappropriately touching
and fondling one student, Alida Star Gebser, during her freshman year in high
school.237 Waldrop began having sexual intercourse with Ms. Gebser during
the spring of her freshman year and into January of her sophomore year, when
Waldrop was arrested after he was discovered having sexual intercourse with
Ms. Gebser.238 Although parents of two other students complained to the school
principal of Waldrop’s sexual comments,239 a complaint was never lodged
regarding Waldrop’s behavior toward, and sexual involvement with, Ms.
Gebser.240 Waldrop’s employment was terminated and his teaching license
revoked after his arrest.241
Ms. Gebser and her mother filed suit in state court alleging, among other
things, that the school district was liable under Title IX for Waldrop’s
conduct.242 The Federal District Court’s summary judgment in favor of the
school district243 was affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth

235. Id. at 277–79.
236. Id. at 277.
237. Id. at 277–78.
238. Id. at 278.
239. Id. (“The principal arranged a meeting, at which, according to the principal, Waldrop
indicated that he did not believe he had made offensive remarks but apologized to the parents and said
it would not happen again. The principal also advised Waldrop to be careful about his classroom
comments and told the school guidance counselor about the meeting, but he did not report the parents’
complaint to Lago Vista’s superintendent, who was the district’s Title IX coordinator.”).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 279 (The case was initially filled in state court and later removed to the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas. The District Court granted Lago Vista summary
judgment on all claims. The case against Waldrop was remanded to state court. Gebser appealed the
summary judgment rejecting her Title IX claim.).
243. Id. (The District Court “reasoned that the statute ‘was enacted to counter policies of
discrimination . . . in federally funded education programs,’ and that ‘[o]nly if school administrators
have some type of notice of the gender discrimination and fail to respond in good faith can the
discrimination be interpreted as a policy of the school district.’ Here, the court determined, the parents’
complaint to the principal concerning Waldrop’s comments in class was the only one Lago Vista had
received about Waldrop, and that evidence was inadequate to raise a genuine issue on whether the
school district had actual or constructive notice that Waldrop was involved in a sexual relationship with
a student.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
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Circuit.244 The Fifth Circuit determined that the school district could not be
held liable under Title IX for sexual harassment of a student by one of its
teachers unless: first, the school district’s employee that was invested with
supervisory control over the teacher actually knew of the sexual harassment;
second, the employee with supervisory control must have the power or authority
to end the abuse; and finally, the employee must have failed to end the sexual
harassment.245
The Supreme Court reached its ruling in Gebser—that a damage remedy
under Title IX is unavailable unless an official of the federal funds recipient that
has authority to both deal with the alleged discrimination and to implement
remedial procedures has actual knowledge that its programs are discriminatory
and also neglects to reasonably respond246—by demonstrating that its ruling
was mandated by Congressional intent and by limitations placed on damages
awards where judicially implied private right of action is fashioned by the
courts.247 The plaintiff in Gebser advanced two possible standards for imposing
liability on the Lago Vista Independent School District for the teacher’s sexual
harassment. The first, respondeat superior, where liability would be imposed
because the teacher’s authority as an employee of the school district facilitated
the sexual harassment of the student.248 Secondly, liability should be imposed
because the school district had constructive notice, in that is, the school “district
knew or ‘should have known’ about harassment but failed to uncover and
244. Id. at 279–80. (“The court first declined to impose strict liability on school districts for a
teacher’s sexual harassment of a student, reiterating its conclusion in Leija that strict liability is
inconsistent with ‘the Title IX contract.’ The court then determined that Lago Vista could not be liable
on the basis of constructive notice, finding that there was insufficient evidence to suggest that a school
official should have known about Waldrop’s relationship with Gebser. Finally, the court refused to
invoke the common law principle that holds an employer vicariously liable when an employee is ‘aided
in accomplishing [a] tort by the existence of the agency relation,’ explaining that application of that
principle would result in school district liability in essentially every case of teacher-student
harassment.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
245. Id. at 280.
246. Id. at 290 (“[W]e hold that a damages remedy will not lie under Title IX unless an official
who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective
measures on the recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s programs
and fails adequately to respond.”).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 281–82. The plaintiff, who was joined by the United States as amicus curiae, would
impose Title IX liability on the school district because the teacher’s authority as an employee of the
federal funds recipient aided the teacher’s ability to carry out his sexual harassment of the student
regardless of whether school district “had any knowledge of the harassment and irrespective of their
response upon becoming aware.” Id. at 281. This position, according to the Supreme Court is “an
expression of respondeat superior liability, i.e., vicarious or imputed liability, under which recovery in
damages against a school district would generally follow whenever a teacher’s authority over a student
facilitates the harassment.” Id. at 282 (citations omitted).
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eliminate it.”249
In rejecting application of the respondeat superior theory to sexual
harassment of a student by a school teacher, the Supreme Court noted that the
plaintiff mistakenly relied on a statement in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools250 to argue that vicarious liability theory, which is generally applied in
employment discrimination cases under Title VII, may be similarly applied to
Title IX claims where the victim of sexual harassment is a student who is not in
an employment relationship with the federal funds recipient.251 The Supreme
Court noted that its decision to impose liability in Franklin did not turn on
constructive notice or imputed liability.252 Rather, there was ample evidence
that the school district in Franklin knew of the sexual harassment but did
nothing about it.253 The Court’s justification for deciding that agency principles
should direct its inquiry concerning imposition of liability under Title VII rested
on the proposition that Title VII prohibits employment discrimination and
defines the term employer to include any agent.254 Title IX, on the other hand,
does not contain an analogous statement, nor does the statute “expressly call for
application of agency principles.”255
Title IX prohibits application of vicarious liability since, unlike Title VII
where Congress specifically provided for a private right of action,256 the private
249. Id.
250. 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (“Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Public
Schools the duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and ‘when a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor “discriminate[s]” on the basis of sex.’ We
believe the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.” (alteration
in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, (1986)).
251. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283 (According to the Court, “[w]hether educational institutions can be
said to violate Title IX based solely on principles of respondeat superior or constructive notice was not
resolved by Franklin’s citation of Meritor. That reference to Meritor was made with regard to the
general proposition that sexual harassment can constitute discrimination on the basis of sex under Title
IX, an issue not in dispute here.” (citation omitted)).
252. Id.
253. Id. (“In fact, the school district’s liability in Franklin did not necessarily turn on principles of
imputed liability or constructive notice, as there was evidence that school officials knew about the
harassment but took no action to stop it.”).
254. Id. at 283.
255. Id. The Court noted,
Moreover, Meritor’s rationale for concluding that agency principles guide the liability inquiry under Title
VII rests on an aspect of that statute not found in Title IX: Title VII, in which the prohibition against
employment discrimination runs against ‘an employer’ explicitly defines ‘employer’ to include ‘any agent.’
Title IX contains no comparable reference to an educational institution’s ‘agents,’ and so does not expressly
call for application of agency principles.

Id. (citations omitted).
256. Id. (“Unlike Title IX, Title VII contains an express cause of action and specifically provides
for relief in the form of monetary damages. Congress therefore has directly addressed the subject of
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right of action under Title IX is judicially implied.257 In fashioning the scope
of the private right of action under Title IX and the scope of the corresponding
damage remedy, the Gebser Court concluded that the purpose of Title IX would
be frustrated if damage recovery against the school district is allowed to proceed
on the basis of respondent superior or constructive notice theory.258 A
requirement that actual notice be received as a condition to recovery would not
frustrate Title IX’s two fold purposes of preventing federal funds from being
used to sustain sexual discrimination and affording citizens effectual safeguards
against discriminatory practices.259
Conditioning the imposition of liability on actual notice of discrimination
and on federal recipient’s failure to take corrective action is consistent with the
contractual relationship between the government and the federal funds recipient
under Title IX260 and distinguishes recipients’ obligations under Title IX from
those under Title VII,261 where the prohibition is not conditional.262
Administrative enforcement of Title IX is also conditioned on actual knowledge
of discrimination in and by institutions receiving federal education funds.263
damages relief under Title VII and has set out the particular situations in which damages are available
as well as the maximum amounts recoverable.” (citations omitted)).
257. Id. at 283–84 (“With respect to Title IX, however, the private right of action is judicially
implied, and there is thus no legislative expression of the scope of available remedies, including when
it is appropriate to award monetary damages.” (citations omitted)).
258. Id. at 285 (“[W]e conclude it would ‘frustrate the purposes’ of Title IX to permit a damages
recovery against a school district for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a student based on principles of
respondent superior or constructive notice, i.e., without actual notice to a school district official.
Because Congress did not expressly create a private right of action under Title IX, the statutory text
does not shed light on Congress’ intent with respect to the scope of available remedies.”).
259. Id. at 286 (“Congress enacted Title IX in 1972 with two principal objectives in mind: ‘[T]o
avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices’ and ‘to provide individual
citizens effective protection against those practices.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Cannon v. Univ.
of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979))).
260. Id. at 286 (Noting the similarity between Title VI and Title IX, the Gebser Court noted that
“[t]he two statutes operate in the same manner, conditioning an offer of federal funding on a promise
by the recipient not to discriminate, in what amounts essentially to a contract between the Government
and the recipient of funds.”).
261. Id. (“That contractual framework distinguishes Title IX from Title VII, which is framed in
terms not of a condition but of an outright prohibition. Title VII applies to all employers without regard
to federal funding and aims broadly to ‘eradicat[e] discrimination throughout the economy.’” (alteration
in original) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 254 (1994)).
262. Id. at 287.
263. Id. at 288. The Court reasoned that
Title IX’s express means of enforcement—by administrative agencies—operates on an assumption of
actual notice to officials of the funding recipient. . . . Significantly, however, an agency may not initiate
enforcement proceedings until it ‘has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply
with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.’ The
administrative regulations implement that obligation, requiring resolution of compliance issues ‘by
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According to the Court, the principal purpose of the notice requirement is to
provide recipients opportunity to voluntarily comply before enforcement action
is taken, and to avoid education funds from being diverted from educationally
useful purposes, “where a recipient was unaware of discrimination in its
programs and is willing to institute prompt corrective measures.”264 It would,
therefore, be unsound for judicially implied private right of action to permit
liability and a damages award without requiring notice to, and opportunity to,
remedy discrimination where the statute’s enforcement structure requires such
notice.265
ii. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education266
Aurelia Davis filed an action against the Monroe County Board of
Education, claiming that her daughter, LaShonda—a fifth grade student—had
experienced prolonged sexual harassment at the hands of a student in her
class.267 The harassment began in December of 1992268 and continued beyond
April of 1993.269 The sexually harassing behavior escalated.270 LaShonda was
informal means whenever possible,’ and prohibiting commencement of enforcement proceedings until the
agency has determined that voluntary compliance is unobtainable and “the recipient . . . has been notified
of its failure to comply and of the action to be taken to effect compliance.”

Id. (citations omitted).
264. Id. at 289.
265. Id. at 289–90.
266. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
267. Id. at 632.
268. Id. at 633–34. In December of 1992, LaShonda’s classmate, G.F., tried to touch her breasts
and genital area and also made sexually offensive remarks to her. Id. at 633. Similar incidents occurred
around January 4 and January 20, 1993. Id. Each incident was reported to LaShonda’s mother, Aurelia,
and her teacher, Diane Fort. Id. at 633–34. Although Aurelia was assured that the school principal
was informed, G.F. was not disciplined by the school for his conduct. Id. at 634.
269. Id. According to the record, during a physical education class in February of 1993, G.F., after
allegedly placing a door stop in his pants, engaged in sexually suggestive behavior toward LaShonda.
Id. A week after reporting this incident to her physical education teacher, another incident occurred
while in the classroom of another teacher, Joyce Pippin. Id. These incidents were reported, but with
no result. Id.
270. Id. The Court reported,
Petitioner alleges that G.F. once more directed sexually harassing conduct toward LaShonda in
physical education class in early March, and that LaShonda reported the incident to both Maples and
Pippen. In mid-April 1993, G.F. allegedly rubbed his body against LaShonda in the school hallway in what
LaShonda considered a sexually suggestive manner, and LaShonda again reported the matter to Fort.
The string of incidents finally ended in mid-May, when G.F. was charged with, and pleaded guilty to,
sexual battery for his misconduct. The complaint alleges that LaShonda had suffered during the months of
harassment, however; specifically, her previously high grades allegedly dropped as she became unable to
concentrate on her studies, and, in April 1993, her father discovered that she had written a suicide note.
The complaint further alleges that, at one point, LaShonda told petitioner that she “didn't know how much
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not the only victim of the sexual harassment.271 Not only was very little done
to prevent or punish the offending student, but LaShonda was also not allowed
to move her seat in the class; she was sitting next to the offending student for
more than three months after the harassment began.272
Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court to determine whether an
institution that receives federal educational funds will be held liable, under any
set of circumstances, for student-on-student sexual harassment.273 According
to the Court, it was asked to do more than determine the conduct prescribed by
Title IX.274 The critical question was whether the school district could be held
liable for its failure to respond to sexual harassment being perpetrated by one
student against other students.275 Citing its decision in Cannon, the Court
confirmed that it had previously determined that an implied private right of
action is available under Title IX,276 and that money damages are recoverable
for its violation.277 The Court observed that it has regarded Title IX as a law
having been enacted under authority granted to Congress by the Spending
Clause of the Constitution.278 Therefore, private damages are only available for
violations of this implied private right of action when recipients of federal
educational funds have notice that they could be liable for the behavior in
question.279
longer she could keep [G.F.] off her.”

Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
271. Id. at 635 (“Nor was LaShonda G. F.’s only victim; it is alleged that other girls in the class
fell prey to G.F.’s conduct. At one point, in fact, a group composed of LaShonda and other female
students tried to speak with Principal Querry about G. F.’s behavior. According to the complaint,
however, a teacher denied the students’ request with the statement, ‘If [Querry] wants you, he’ll call
you.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
272. Id. (“Nor, according to the complaint, was any effort made to separate G. F. and LaShonda.
On the contrary, notwithstanding LaShonda’s frequent complaints, only after more than three months
of reported harassment was she even permitted to change her classroom seat so that she was no longer
seated next to G. F.” (citations omitted)).
273. Id. at 639.
274. Id.
275. Id. (“Here, however, we are asked to do more than define the scope of the behavior that Title
IX proscribes. We must determine whether a district’s failure to respond to student-on-student
harassment in its schools can support a private suit for money damages.”).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 640; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
279. Davis, 526 U.S. at 640. According to the Supreme Court,
When Congress acts pursuant to its spending power, it generates legislation “much in the nature of a
contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.” In
interpreting language in spending legislation, we thus “insis[t] that Congress speak with a clear voice,”
recognizing that “[t]here can, of course, be no knowing acceptance [of the terms of the putative contract] if
a State is unaware of the conditions [imposed by the legislation] or is unable to ascertain what is expected
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The Supreme Court rejected the school district’s argument that the liability
sought to be imposed on the district was for conduct of a third party and not for
its own behavior.280 In rejecting the district’s argument, the Court determined
the conduct for which the district would be held liable was its decision to remain
idle—turning a blind eye—in the face of student on student sexual harassment
in its program.281 The Court made a distinction between the notice limitations
imposed on the federal funds recipient as to the scope of potential activities that
may be prohibited by Title IX282 and whether the recipient had notice that the
prohibited conduct is being carried under its programs.283
When an institution accepts federal educational funds, the contract entered
into with the government is an agreement to abide by congressionally imposed
conditions established when Congress acted under the Spending Clause of the
Constitution.284 Congress may act pursuant to its authority under the Spending
of it.”

Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
280. Id. at 640–41 (The Court agreed that Title IX imposes liability for the conduct of the federal
funds recipient that “‘[E]xclud[e] [persons] from participation in, . . . den[y] [persons] the benefits of,
or . . . subjec[t] [persons] to discrimination under’ its ‘program[s] or activit[ies]’ in order to be liable
under Title IX. The Government’s enforcement power may only be exercised against the funding
recipient, and we have not extended damages liability under Title IX to parties outside the scope of this
power.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
281. Id. at 641–42.
282. Id. (“We recognized that the scope of liability in private damages actions under Title IX is
circumscribed by Pennhurst’s requirement that funding recipients have notice of their potential
liability. Invoking Pennhurst, Guardians Ass’n, and Franklin, in Gebser we once again required ‘that
the “receiving entity of federal funds [have] notice that it will be liable for a monetary award”’ before
subjecting it to damages liability.” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
283. The Court noted that the limitation recognized by Pennhurst and its progeny, although
protecting the federal funds recipient from vicarious liability for actions of its employees or agents on
a negligence theory, the limitation does not insulate the federal funds recipient from liability for its own
intentional discrimination in violation of Title IX. The Court reasoned that,
In particular, we concluded that Pennhurst does not bar a private damages action under Title IX where the
funding recipient engages in intentional conduct that violates the clear terms of the statute.
Accordingly, we rejected the use of agency principles to impute liability to the district for the
misconduct of its teachers. Likewise, we declined the invitation to impose liability under what amounted
to a negligence standard—holding the district liable for its failure to react to teacher-student harassment of
which it knew or should have known. Rather, we concluded that the district could be liable for damages
only where the district itself intentionally acted in clear violation of Title IX by remaining deliberately
indifferent to acts of teacher-student harassment of which it had actual knowledge. Contrary to the dissent’s
suggestion, the misconduct of the teacher in Gebser was not “treated as the grant recipient’s actions.”
Liability arose, rather, from “an official decision by the recipient not to remedy the violation.”

Id. at 642 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524
U.S. 274, 290 (1998).
284. The Spending Clause, Article I, Section 8 of the U S. Constitutions provides: “The Congress
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises
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Clause only when recipients of federal funds voluntarily and knowingly accept
the conditions and terms of the assumed contract with the government.285
Further, as the Court acknowledged in Davis, there can be no knowing
acceptance unless federal funds recipients are aware of the conditions imposed
by Congress or are able to determine what is expected of them.286 In the case
of Title IX, recipients of federal educational funds must have notice from the
statute that Congress prohibits certain behavior. Notice of the scope of conduct
Title IX was enacted to proscribe may be found in the express terms of the
statute, its statutory structure, and the nature of the enforcement powers granted
federal agencies to insure compliance.287
The Supreme Court rejected the school district’s argument in Davis that
student-on-student sexual harassment is not a form of discrimination that falls
within the scope of Title IX, because discrimination of third parties is not
discrimination committed by the school district.288 In doing so, the Supreme
Court ruled that the school district was on notice that it could be obligated to
prevent discrimination perpetrated by third parties, in this case a student.289
Notice to the district was provided by the statute and the enforcement agencies
that the district has an affirmative obligation to prevent sexual discrimination
by third parties over which it has authority and control.290
Having determined that the school district was on notice that it could be
potentially liable for student-on-student sexual harassment, the Supreme Court
identified a second form of notice federal funds recipients must have before they
may be held liable, which notice relates to the elements of the judicially implied
right of action under Title IX. To be liable for damages, the federal funds
recipient must have knowledge that beneficiaries of its educational programs
are being discriminated against under circumstances where the district has
authority to act and fails to act by remaining deliberately indifferent to the plight
shall be uniform throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
285. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“The legitimacy of
Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and
knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”).
286. Davis, 526 U.S. at 640.
287. Id. at 638–39, 644.
288. Id. at 642.
289. Id. at 643–44. According to the Court,
[T]he regulatory scheme surrounding Title IX has long provided funding recipients with notice that
they may be liable for their failure to respond to the discriminatory acts of certain nonagents. The
Department of Education requires recipients to monitor third parties for discrimination in specified
circumstances and to refrain from particular forms of interaction with outside entities that are known
to discriminate.

Id.
290. See id. at 645, 647–48.
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the class of persons Title IX was enacted to benefit. The intentional
discrimination for which the federal funds recipient will be held liable for is
their deliberate indifference to discrimination against a class of beneficiaries of
Title IX.291 Deliberate indifference to discriminatory conduct by third parties
that prevents students enrolled in the district programs from gaining equal
access to educational services is a form of intentional discrimination that falls
within Title IX’s scope.292
5. Deliberate Indifference to the Lack of Equal Access to Sports
Opportunities for Protected Groups Constitutes Actionable Discrimination
Under Title IX
The argument made in this section is that the failure to effectively
accommodate the interest of or to provide sports participation opportunities for
African-American girls, girls from other minority groups, or girls from urban,
rural, and economically disadvantaged communities—although traceable to
race, cultural, or economic factors—constitutes intentional discrimination in
violation of Title IX. Deliberate indifference to the lack of effective
accommodation and participation opportunities available to these girls,
regardless of its origin, is a form of intentional discrimination under Title IX.
Educational institutions that receive federal educational funds intentionally
discriminate in violation of Title IX when these institutions are deliberately
indifferent to gender inequity experienced by girls that are members of these
identity groups.293 The fact that racial discrimination, which may have been
caused by another entity—and for which that entity may be liable—does not

291. Id. at 642 (“Rather, we concluded that the district could be liable for damages only where the
district itself intentionally acted in clear violation of Title IX by remaining deliberately indifferent to
acts of teacher-student harassment of which it had actual knowledge.” (emphasis added)).
292. Id. at 650. According to the Court,
The statute makes clear that, whatever else it prohibits, students must not be denied access to educational
benefits and opportunities on the basis of gender. We thus conclude that funding recipients are properly
held liable in damages only where they are deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which they
have actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive
the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.

Id.
293. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998); see also Black, supra note
125, at 371 (“The Gebser line of cases demonstrates that a defendant also violates Title VI and Title IX
when it takes intentional action/inaction that causes, contributes to, or perpetuates the discrimination
or disadvantages that occur within its programs.” (emphasis added)). The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals applied the “deliberate indifference” doctrine under Title VI in Zeno v. Pine Planes Central
School District, 702 F.3rd 655, 671 (2nd Cir. 2012) to “conclude that there was sufficient evidence in
the record to support the jury’s finding that the District’s responses to student harassment of Anthony
‘‘amount[ed] to deliberate indifference to discrimination.”
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absolve the recipient of federal educational funds of its obligation to address the
resultant gender inequity caused thereby.294
i.

Educational Institutions Failure to Provide Interscholastic Participation
Opportunities for Girls, Regardless of Race or Economic Status, Is Within
the Scope of Discriminatory Practices Title IX Was Intended to Reach

The Supreme Court has already determined that an implied private right of
action is available under Title XI, and that money damages are recoverable for
its violation.295 Private damages are only available for violations of Title IX
when recipients of federal educational funds have notice that the offending
conduct falls within the scope of statute.296 Title IX is applicable to educational
institutions, which includes secondary schools.297
The regulations
implementing Title IX specifically provide that a “recipient which operates or
sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall
provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes.”298 Clearly
educational institutions that receive federal educations funds are aware of the
conditions Title IX attaches to those funds (i.e. that recipients of those funds
must afford equal access to members of both sexes to athletic opportunities,
including African-Americans and girls from other minority groups, girls from
urban communities, and girls from economically disadvantaged
communities.299
ii. Private Cause of Action Requires Notice to Offending Institutions that
Beneficiaries of Title IX the Lack of Equal Access to Athletic
Opportunities
Once it is clear that recipients of federal educational funds have notice that
they could fall within the ambit of Title IX and potentially exposed for their
failure to provide equal access to athletic participation opportunities for girls,

294. Black, supra note 125, at 371 (“Such a violation occurs, even when the defendant did not
initially desire or act to create discrimination or disadvantage, if the discrimination and disadvantage
continue to occur because the defendant knowingly refuses or fails to intervene.”).
295. Davis, 526 U.S. at 640.
296. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283–84.
297. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (“For purposes of this chapter an educational institution means any
public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution of vocational,
professional, or higher education, except that in the case of an educational institution composed of more
than one school, college, or department which are administratively separate units, such term means
each such school, college, or department. . . .”).
298. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2012).
299. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286.
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regardless of their race, ethnic background, or community of origin, Title IX
further requires notice that girls within programs are not actually being afforded
equal access to athletic participation opportunities.
According to the Supreme Court in Gebser, the principal purpose of actual
notice is to provide recipients an opportunity to voluntarily comply before
enforcement action is taken. Notice also avoids educational funds from being
diverted from educationally useful purposes, as “where a recipient was unaware
of discrimination in its programs and is willing to institute prompt corrective
measures.”300 The Court concluded that it would therefore be unsound for a
judicially implied private right of action to permit liability and damages award
without requiring notice to and opportunity to remedy discrimination, where the
statute’s enforcement structure requires such notice.301
The Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has said that
an institution violates Title IX if it fails to meet any of the three elements of the
“three prong test.”302 The “three prong test” was derived by the OCR in its 1979
Policy Interpretation and provided three benchmarks for demonstrating
effective accommodation claims under Title IX.303 Under the “three prong
test,” a federal funds recipient had to establish either that: 1) the educational
institution is providing athletic participation opportunities to members of each
sex in numbers that are substantially proportionate to their respective enrollment
at that institution; 2) the institution has demonstrated a history of
accommodating the athletic interests of the underrepresented sex; or 3) that the
athletic interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex has been effectively
accommodated.304

300. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289. See discussion supra Parts IV(A)(4)(i) (indicating that imposing
liability under a respondent superior theory would allow education funds to be diverted from
educationally useful purposes).
301. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
302. See Andrew J. Weissler, Unasked Questions: Applying Title IX’s Effective Accommodation
Mandate to Interscholastic Athletics, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 71, 80–81 (2012).
303. Id. In 1975, the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) listed
ten (10) nonexclusive factors courts should consider in determining whether an educational institution
is in compliance with Title IX, the first of which was “[w]hether the selection of sports and levels of
competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes.” Id. at 79.
Claims filed under this first factor were later referred to as “effective accommodation” claims. Id. The
other nine factors were referred to as “equal treatment” claims. Id. The “three prong test” came out of
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR), 1979 Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at
71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979), and provided three benchmarks for demonstrating effective accommodation
claims. Id. at 80–81.
304. Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road Toward
Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 51, 62 (1996) (“Under the
first prong, the court examines whether athletic participation opportunities are provided to each sex in
numbers substantially proportionate to their enrollment. If a school cannot meet this prong, the court
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Title IX and its implementing regulations apply to interscholastic athletics.
Scholars, however, have taken three different views in applying the “three prong
test” to determine whether educational institutions have effectively
accommodated the interest of both sexes in the context of interscholastic
athletics.305
One approach is to apply the tests to interscholastic athletics exactly as the
courts have applied in the intercollegiate context.306 Other commentators take
the position that the “three prong test,” considering the impact of its application
to intercollegiate athletics, is appropriate and should not be applied to
interscholastic athletics.307 Finally, some scholars, while recognizing that
interscholastic athletics is a legitimate gender discrimination subject, remedying
discriminatory impacts in interscholastic institutions pose such unique problems
strict application of the three prong test is simply unworkable. These scholars
are nevertheless willing to propose alternative solutions even if they are
inconsistent with the statutory framework of Title IX.308
This Article does not advocate adoption of these approaches, nor does it
advance a fourth alternative. It does not attempt to reconcile them either.
Instead, the author takes the position that regardless of the agency’s articulated
then determines whether the school can demonstrate a history and continuing practice of program
expansion for the underrepresented sex. If a school fails the second prong, the court finally asks
whether the athletic interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex have been fully and effectively
accommodated by the school. If the plaintiffs can show that the school also fails on this third prong,
then the court must find the school out of compliance with Title IX. In applying this three-prong test,
courts have arrived at the same conclusion: that the schools that have been challenged to date have
failed to provide adequate opportunity to their female athletes and thereby are violating federal law.”).
305. Weissler, supra note 304, at 73–74 (noting that although “the guidance developed for
intercollegiate athletics is meant to apply to interscholastic athletics only ‘when appropriate,’ and no
further guidance has been provided for when such appropriateness exists,” the “when appropriate”
language has been ignored by courts when applying the Policy Interpretations to interscholastic
athletics). Not only have courts ignored the differences between the maturity and skill level of
intercollegiate athletes and interscholastic athletes in applying the three prong test, so have scholars.
Id. at 74.
306. Id. at 74 (citing Ray Yasser & Samuel J. Schiller, Gender Equity in Athletics: The New
Battleground of Interscholastic Sports, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 371 (1997); Lynne Tatum,
Comment, Girls in Sports: Love of the Game Must Begin at an Early Age to Achieve Equality, 12 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 281 (2002)).
307. Id. (citing Allison Kasic, Title IX Enforcement Could Devastate High School Sports, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2011/02/16/title-ixenforcement-could-devastate-high-school-sports; Letter from Joshua P. Thompson, Attorney, Pac.
Legal Found., To Whom It May Concern, Office for Civil Rights, Chi. Office, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.
(Feb. 8, 2011), available at http://www.pacificlegal.org/document.doc?id=514).
308. Id. (citing Patrick N. Findlay, The Case for Requiring a Proportionality Test to Assess
Compliance with Title IX in High School Athletics, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 29, 36-40 (2002); Carolyn
Davis, Note, Leave It on the Field: Too Expansive an Approach to Evaluating Title IX Compliance in
Biediger v. Quinnipiac University?, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 265, 272-73 (2010)).
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rationale for application of Title IX’s proscriptions and remedies applicable to
intercollegiate athletics, turning a blind eye to gender based inequities
experienced by girls at the interscholastic level who are members of certain
identify groups—namely African-Americans, Hispanic and Asian girls, and
girls from urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged communities—
constitutes intentional discrimination under the Supreme Court’s deliberate
indifference jurisprudence under Title IX.
In the author’s view, any federal funds recipient, at any level of athletics,
should be held liable if it can be established that such institutions are
deliberately indifferent to discrimination against a protected class of Title IX
beneficiaries, after notice of its existence, and they act to perpetuate such
discrimination.309 Using this more elemental approach, the next question is
exactly what forms of institutional conduct should constitute the kind of
deliberate indifference so as to trigger Title IX liability for interscholastic
institutions?
iii. Notice that Girls Are Not Being Afforded Equal Access to Athletic
Participation Opportunities Must Be Given to Someone With Authority to
Prevent the Discrimination
The Supreme Court ruled in Gebser that a damage remedy under Title IX is
unavailable unless an official of the federal funds recipient that has authority to
both deal with the alleged discrimination and to implement remedial procedures
has actual knowledge that its programs are discriminatory and also neglects to
reasonably respond.310 The Supreme Court in Gebser recognized that the
school principal was such a person. The plaintiff in Gebser correctly identified
the school principal as the person that has authority to address the alleged
discrimination and to implement remedial procedures, however, the plaintiff
failed on providing such notice. Rather than notifying the principal that the
student was being sexually harassed by the teacher, parents complained that the
teacher made sexually inappropriate remarks during class.311
309. Black, supra note 125, at 379 (“The Gebser line of cases demonstrates that the statutory bar
of discrimination in federally funded programs—which the Court has interpreted to mean “intentional”
discrimination—also prohibits volitional actions that effectively perpetuate discrimination, undermine
congressional intent, or subject individuals to inequality.”).
310. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).
311. Id. at 291. According to the Gebser Court,
The only official alleged to have had information about Waldrop’s misconduct is the high school principal.
That information, however, consisted of a complaint from parents of other students charging only that
Waldrop had made inappropriate comments during class, which was plainly insufficient to alert the
principal to the possibility that Waldrop was involved in a sexual relationship with a student.

Id.
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Moreover, there are a number of other parties within educational institutions
that receive federal funds that would satisfy the requirement that notice must be
given to an official of the federal funds recipient that has authority to both deal
with the alleged discrimination and to implement remedial procedures. At the
interscholastic level, “official notice” may be provided to school administrators,
School District Boards of Directors, Superintendents, Athletic Director,
teachers, or even other coaches. Such notice can be implied from the statistical
evidence that is readily available through a variety of governmental agencies.
The statistics in this Article clearly demonstrate a lack of access to sports
opportunities for African-American girls and girls from other minority groups,
girls from urban and girls from economically disadvantaged communities
currently exists in institutions offering interscholastic athletics. Determining
whether these statistics are also true with respect to particular federal
educational funds recipients offering interscholastic athletics is the first step.
Providing official notice to institutional administrators that the Title IX rights
of African-American girls and girls from other minority groups, girls from
urban communities, and girls from economically disadvantaged communities
are being violated is the next step. With the notice and opportunity to cure issue
resolved, access to statutory remedies can readily be pursued to bring these
identity groups within the orbit of statutory protections Title IX was created to
promote.
V. CONCLUSION
Interscholastic educational institutions may be held liable for their failure
to achieve gender equity for minority female students and gender equity for
females from urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged communities.
Gender equity, with respect to access to participation opportunities in emerging
women’s sports, must be achieved in middle and high school athletic programs,
if gender equity is to be achieved at the collegiate level for girls from these
identity groups. Participation opportunities in NCAA designated emerging
sports (volleyball, lacrosse, soccer, crew, water polo, and equestrian) must
realistically be available to middle school and high schools girls in urban, rural,
minority, and economically disadvantaged communities. Unfortunately for
girls from these communities, participation opportunities are only available in
traditional women’s sports: basketball and track and field. Unless middle
school and high schools girls in urban, rural, and minority communities are
given the opportunities to participate in the emerging women’s sports, the fact
is that gender equity is being (facially) achieved only because Title IX
requirements are implemented without specific regard to detrimental impacts
failure to remedy lack of participation opportunities for those subgroups.
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Under Title IX there are two categories of intentional discrimination that
are both actionable under Title IX. The first is direct discrimination by a
perpetrator of the discrimination; the person that directly discriminates against
victims. The second intentional discrimination category is not the perpetrator or
the party causing the discrimination, but the party who knows or learns of the
discrimination, has the authority to take corrective action, but fails to take such
action.
The first category of discriminatory conduct is actionable as traditional
intentional discrimination where the perpetrator liability is imposed because the
perpetrator’s conduct is motivated by a discriminatory purpose. The second
category is more nuanced. The discriminatory actor in this case is not the direct
actor. In fact, the violator may have no motive to discriminate at all, or the
discrimination experienced by the victim may have been unintentional. The
violator in this case learns of the discriminatory effect and turns a blind eye to
injury. More accurately, the violator is indifferent to the discriminatory effects
of the conduct of the intentional discriminator or the discriminatory effects of it
policies or programs. It is my contention that this second form of intentional
discrimination, “deliberate indifference,” is actionable intentional
discrimination under Title IX.
A school district may be liable for this second form of intentional
discrimination where, for example, its athletic resource allocation decisions
provide athletic participation opportunities for majority and economically
advantaged female students without regard to the interests of other female
subgroups. Such a school district may not be motivated by discriminatory
animus, but what happens when its administrators learn that their actions have
worked an unintended discriminatory effect on distinctly identifiable subgroups
of female students protected under Title IX? However, when a school district,
rather than ameliorating the known discriminatory effects of its resource
allocation decision-making on protected subgroups under Title IX, simply
ignores the discriminatory effect of its decisions, it has violated the law.
To be certain, the school district’s original “remedial” allocation decisionmaking will not, standing alone, breach the Supreme Court’s traditional
intentional discrimination standard. However, the intentional act which will
result in liability is the “deliberate indifference” to the effects of that decisionmaking on protected subgroups. The doctrine holds that it is the decision not to
ameliorate the unintended consequences of its original decision to allocate
resources that is the wrongful act.

